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The thesis of the attached report is that weapons acquisition
cost growth can be characterized with a fair degree of accuracy.






The study highlighted an ail-too typical scenario: contrac-
tors buy-in; program/contract changes occur; quantities and
budgets vascillate causing program stretch-out that becomes
increasingly expensive with passage of time; all leading to
inevitable cost growth.
The report asserts that the CNM can effect improvement unilat-
erally in each of these four areas.
Improvement must stem from procedural changes mandated by the CNM
accompanied by attitudinal change that must be instilled through-
out the Naval Material Command— instituted by the CNM top down
and pursued relentlessly for as long as it takes to effect the
change desired.
The state of the Navy and the Nation demands nothing less.
-i f-










RECAPITULATION OF SALIENT MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM PRIOR STUDIES AND ASSESSMENT OF STATUS OF
RECOMMENDATIONS
ISSUES






















Both cost growth and absolute cost of weapon system programs
are an acute defense issue. The effects of cost growth are
evidenced as less defense capability and lessened public con-
fidence in the ability of the Department of Defense to exercise
effective stewardship of public tax dollars. Reagan Administra-
tion increases in defense outlays mandate a heightened awareness
of weapon system cost and increased effectiveness in constraining
unnecessary weapon system cost growth.
A plethora of past studies and implementation plans for
corrective action have been generated. Nevertheless, managers
of weapons programs continue to be caught by surprise as weapon
program costs increase dramatically over initial program profiles
Past studies generally allocate weapon program cost growth
as follows:
1. Escalation
2. Program quantity and





This study was commissioned by the CNM to:
1. Identify salient recommendations of past study
groups and to determine the extent of their
implementation.
2. Assess the reasons for nonimplementation of
reasonable past recommended action.
3. Lay out actions that can be undertaken uni-
laterally by the Chief of Naval Material to
constrain unnecessary weapons program cost growth.
ORGANIZATION OF STUDY REPORT
Past studies identify a broad range of causes and symptoms
of cost growth. These causes were categorized for purposes of
this study into 15 major issues of which several in turn are
comprised of one or more subissues. The listing of issues/sub-
issues is set forth as Appendix A.
Past studies that were reviewed are identified in Appendix B
Bibliography (some 200 in number).
Reasons for nonimplementation of past study recommendations
were solicited from knowledgeable Navy and industry representatives
Their organizations are listed in Appendix C. key individuals
contacted are not identified as they were assured during each
interview that their comments would be used on a non-attribution
basis.
Salient recommendations from prior studies are arranged
within the 14 "issues" and are set forth in Section I, Part A.
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the recommendations. An assessment is made on two levels: (1)
"some" progress or (2) "almost no" progress. Of 50 salient recom-
mendations reviewed "some" progress is perceived to have occurred
relative to 25. "Almost no" progress is perceived to have occurred
on the remainder.
Section I, Part B elaborates upon each of the 14 issues and
related subissues by describing the issue "problem," stating a
conclusion as to the current status of the problem and setting
forth recommended action.
It became apparent in reviewing past study recommendations
that the causes and effects of cost growth are frequently inter-
mingled. We have attempted to depict these relationships as we
see them in the form of an iceberg. Fundamental and relatively
intractable causes are shown near the bottom; those causes which
receive visibility most frequently are illustrated above the water.
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A set of recommendations that can be implemented within the
NMC with little or no dependence upon, or cooperation from,
higher authority is set forth in Section II, Part A of the study.
There is a set of more sweeping actions that could be taken
given the new administration's receptivity to proposals for con-
crete action to overhaul existing processes. These more drastic
actions would require overt participation or at least passive
cooperation by the Secretariat and OPNAV. YJe have not complicated
this report with those recommended actions.
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION
The main thesis of this report is that we simply do not
practice good business management in the Navy. The majority of
acquisition practitioners are "engineers" who attempt to make
business judgements lacking the proper training and background
necessary to more enlightened decision making. The balance are
contracting officials who are attempting to satisfy the over-
whelming burden of living within the constraints of every-
increasing rules, regulations and statutes. The broadest aspects
of the acquisition strategy are reviewed at very high levels to
assure all sacred cows have been accommodated; virtually no one
in the process analyzes the acquisition from a strict business
management point of view.
Industry interviewees admit candidly to "buying in," and
they explain in very rational terms why that is done. Most
interviewees told us that the buy-in was a conscious decision,
driven by the need to underbid the competition and fit their
perception of Navy's budget profile. They intend at the outset
to swallow most of the underbid, hoping to implement in-house
cost efficiencies, etc., to remain within contract limits after
award. Things go reasonably well for about one year following
award while effort is in the initial "paper" and start-up stages.
When larger, hard-core effort is undertaken the bow wave
eventually falls back on the contractors. Then their projections
of cost growth exceed levels that they were willing previously
to absorb. At that time we are hit with the "surprise:" cost
growth.
In reality, the surprise should be no surprise at all. If
we understand the scenario in which we are placing our major
contractors, we should anticipate these results every time.
Most industry interviewees volunteered the perception that
Navy acquisition personnel were intelligent, hard working, and
dedicated. They all stressed disappointment at the naivete of
these personnel in the business management arena. This, too,
should come as no surprise. We have project managers who are
superb Naval officers but have little practical experience in
dealing with industry. Our acquisition engineers are people who
are technically trained initially , but because of the "system" and
undermanning they have become estranged from the profession and
have out of necessity been turned into professional bureaucrats
to ply the trade of "paper pushing.
"
We diffuse authority and program direction through every
layer of the government hierarchy from the lowest level of
project engineer to congressional staff. Decisions are made at
every level based on personal perceptions of "what A-109 means,"
or political influences.
What appears to be least understood are the hidden costs of
doing business with the Navy. We cajole, motivate and influence
industry to:
spend vast sums in pursuit of business that
seldom materializes in the timeframe initially
envisioned, the quantities promised or within the
budget profile proposed,
institute proposal teams to research, market
and develop concepts with little probability of
winning a contract, and
accept low profits and abnormally low target
costs.
All of this costs money, For a business to stay viable, it
must recoup these costs and earn a profit, These costs are re-
couped in the form of cost growth or prices that might otherwise
have been lower. The latter is particularly true when capital
improvements have not been made because available funds have
been redirected toward commercial endeavors where more reasonable
profits can be anticipated.
One way to get at the guts of the problem is to personalize
it. For example, if it were my money, I would not:
buy at inefficient rates
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permit gaps between program phases
maintain competition beyond where it
makes sense to do so
pay for voluminous documentation just to
be safe in case of later audit
allow programs to be prosecuted without a
validated cost control system in place
shift risk unreasonably to the contractors
allow critical, multi-million dollar programs to
be managed by pitifully few persons with little
business management experience with dependence
on the "beltway support community" for a good
deal of my program management
attempt to manage programs effectively with
little or no management reserve
use scarce resources to develop our own system
when operational systems might be acquired
at less cost from our allies
permit substantial risk in a program con-
strained by cost and schedule
buy CFE when I could get a better price
through GFE
pay extra just to satisfy socio-economic goals
generate "specious" competition or pay for
data packages for future competitive "repro-
curement" when it is doubtful that such
reprocurement will occur.
In reality, it is my money and the preceding list describes
actions that are all too common and that are reported in each
study of the acquisition process.
Despite isolated improvements, examples abound where programs
are structured and executed in certain ways because "the system"
seems to demand such action. When one examines specific situa-
tions one finds however, that "it didn't have to be done that
• 7-
way." Much of what goes on we do to ourselves.
We cannot change unilaterally such things as:
the RAN/D&F thresholds
the $5 million multi-year termination
liability ceiling
the. $2 million reprogramming threshold
We can however change the attitudes and procedures that
operate within the Material Command to cause us to be inadequate
business managers.
That requires not only a series of specific procedural
changes but a change in attitude. Procedural changes can be
legislated by fiat and we recommend that be done. Attitudinal
change will be much more difficult to bring about unless we make
it our first priority order of business. We recommend also
that we do just that. Recommendations for each of the issues
(and subissues) are set forth in Section II, Part A, This collec-
tion of recommendations is the most significant part of the report,
However, there are several procedural type notions, out of the
mainstream, which we have chosen to highlight as part of this
summary. These are as follows:
I. Using headquarters NAVMAT ceiling, select and train
a cadre of SES level business management experts and then assign
them direct to 3YSC0M Commanders, major PM's, DSMC and ASN staffs.
Their functions would be:
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a approve acquisition strategies for the
SYSCOM Commander including those which
normally would go to HQNAVMAT for approval
b. chair ARB's that otherwise would have gone
to HQNAVMAT
c. assure programs are in place for training
acquisition personnel in good business manage-
ment principles and practices
d. work to bridge the gap between contracting and
project management communities.
It would be wise to rotate these executives about every two years,
The person assigned to DSMC could be the Acquisition Chair.
Those assigned to ASN staffs (or industry) would be on a develop-
ment assignment.
2. Establish, very carefully, a "test case" where one
project office in NAVSEA and NAVAIR is designated as such. With
respect to each such project office carry out the following:
Pick a qualified contracting officer and
designate him Deputy Project Manager. Require
him to physically reside in the Project Office.
Empower him with unlimited contracting officer
authority. Groom such individual as a prospec-
tive future Project Manager.
Alternatively consider designating the Project
Manager as contracting officer. Detail one
or more nonsupervisory contract negotiators
to the PM staff. Require such personnel to
be located physically in the PM office.
Delegate unlimited contracting officer authority
to the SUPSHIP/NAVPRO, etc., applicable to the
aforementioned "test case" project offices.'
Designate one member of the OGC staff as counsel
to each "test case" project office. Require such
designated OGC personnel to be located physically
in the PM office. Empower such OGC personnel
to approve for OGC any and all actions that
would normally be screened by OGC under existing
procedures.
3. Establish realistic management reserves pertinent
to each "test case" project. Fence such funds so that they are
not subject to being "swept up" by the SYSCOM Comptroller.
Empower the PM to reapply to this project at his discretion any
funds that he generates from cost avoidance, cost savings, etc.
Exercise the full weight of CNM authority/influence to preclude
higher authority from holding hostage any funds that have been
appropriated pertinent to the "test case" project office efforts.
4. Establish within each SYSCOM a project management
reserve "pool" operated by the Comptroller whereby each PM has
an amount "on the books" from which he can draw up to his allocated
amount. Permit PMs to negotiate trades between each other so long
as the Comptroller maintains the books and knows the status of
each PM's management reserve. CNM ensure that such reserves are
not "raided" for other purposes.
5. To the extent possible prohibit interference in
project office conduct of business by outside influences such as
Navy Area Audit, GAO and NAVMAT internal review personnel.
6. Strongly encourage the "test case" PM's to solicit
proposals based on "stepladder" quantities and optimum rate of
effort (as seen by the contending contractors).
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7. Empower the "test case" PM to be the source selection
authority. Encourage the PM to solicit technical proposals and
eliminate X number based on technical evaluation alone. Negotiate
with remaining contenders. Make award based predominantly on track
record credibility cost coupled with proven technical competence.
8. Draft class determinations and findings (CD&F's)
pertinent to the procurements involved in the "test case"
projects. Obtain Secretarial approval of these CD&F's such that
no subsequent approvals of procurement transactions pertinent
to the "test case" projects are necessary.
Last : Advise the CNO and the Secretariat of the "test
case" procedure and seek OPNAV/Secretariat cooperation in nro^
hibiting program/ funding turbulence involving the "test case"
programs.
The preceding procedural changes can be tracked and concrete
accomplishment or lack thereof should be evident. More difficult
to accomplish and track is the task of altering attitudes within
the Naval Material Command.
We have to somehow alter the "overprotective syndrome."
Responsibility and authority are so fragmented into "protective
cells" that decision making is severely slowed. At current
inflation rates the constipator in the decision making process
is costing us at least 14% of the cost of whatever is being
acquired for each month of delay, I am convinced that the cost
of protection or "insurance" is severely out of proportion to
the value derived therefrom.
-11-
Actions recommended to alter the overprotective syndrome
and thereby alter the attitudes of our people are summarized as
follows:
First : CNM and , SYSCOM Commanders direct a
campaign of delegating authority and responsibility
to the lowest levels possible commensurate with
the ability of specific persons involved to
accommodate such increased authority and responsibility.
'Second : iAdopt a philosophy relative to weapons
development/acquisition risk that defers unacceptable
risk to a preplanned subsequent upgrade. (Accept less
perfection in earlier time frames; but plan for and
carry out feasible upgrades in subsequent time frames.)
SUMMARY
The situation the Navy faces with respect to weapons system
development and acquisition can be characterized graphically by
the following analogy where there are too many boats
waiting
12-
oass through a narrow channel
m
We must concentrate on both widening the channel and reduc-





PART A RECAPITULATION OF SALIENT MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM PRIOR STUDIES AND ASSESSMENT OF STATUS OF
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RECAPITULATION OF SALIENT MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS







Issue 1: Acquisition Strategy
Recommendations: References
1. Provide adequate funding for authorized
programs.
1, 3, 4, 6, 73, 74,
101, 128 207, 209,
217, 225, 226
•
2. Expand use of multi-year funding authori-
zation. Raise cancellation ceiling limi-
tations.
3, 4, 6, 11, 12
60, 107, 128, 207,
209, 214, 217, 229,
230
i
3. Establish firm requirements (including pro-
duction quantities), inviolate except for
threat change.
3, 4, 6, 12, 70, 73,
74, 102, 105, 120, 124,
127, 207, 209, 217,
226
4. Consider competition in all phases of
acquisition.




5. Increase RAN/D&F and reprogramming
thresholds.
4, 6, 12, 128, 207,






6. Rationalize OSARC/PPBS Processes 1, 3, 4, 6, 209,
217, 222 i
!
7. Establish contingency resources for un-
foreseen program issues (including deficien-
cies in fielded systems).
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12,
120, 209, 217
!
8. Limit FSD to systems intended to be procured. 1, 3, 4, 12, 101,
209, 217, 225
9. Consider system upgrade (including subsystems)
as an alternative solution.
1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 64,
111, 115, 117, 209
'
10. Milestone II is significant decision point;
a) overlap testing with both development
and production when risk and urgency are
appropriate; b) authorize high rate pro-
duction at DSARC III.










Mixed Bag - Need hard data. CNM can do little
more than take hard stand regards implemen-
tation of programs that are funded inade-
quately.
Could come to pass if HR 745 is adopted.
Prospects for legislation being adopted
are reasonably good. Need to orchestrate
strategy lobbying effort. Be prepared with
hard data for hearings.
Still lots of Navy self-induced turbulence.
Can't blame it all on OSO.
Strong threat within Navy toward increased
competition. But, many now argue that we're
inducing too much "specious" competition.
Thrust may be in wrong direction.
o 5 Jan 81 MAT 08 memo to ASN (RE3S)
Lots of rhetoric - no real action.
Perception is no progress. But need hard
data to be sure.
Principle appears to be in place.
No data to indicate this is being done.
a) F-18 example (but F-18 experiencing
considerable cost growth).
b) No experience that this is happening,
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Issue 2: Faulty Initial Budgeting
Recommendations : References
1. Increase mgt. reserves and reprogramming 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12,
authority to accommodate the unexpected but 112, 128, 209, 217
statistically determinable problems that
will arise.
2. Strengthen each agency's cost-estimating 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12,
capability to provide realistic estimates 55, 74, 101, 102,
(including inflation or constant-year 105, 115, 120,
budgeting). 209, 220
3. Create an environment to encourage in- 3, 4, 6, 12, 112, 120,
creased realism. 128, 171, 207, 209
4. Fund program at program (NAVSEA) esti- 6
mate: otherwise reduce scope or
terminate.
5, Establish a realistic baseline (probable 2, 3, 101, 120







X No hard evidence of any progress in this area
X Except for CNM Headquarters - vertically no
improvement
X Industry says no progress. Navy internally
thinks otherwise. Probably should believe
industry.
X Lots of lip service - little hard data to
support contention Navy does this.
X Everyone in house claims to do this. If so,
results should be more evident and they are
not.
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Issue 3: Program Turbulence
Recommendations :
1. Set realistic schedules and recognize
schedule risk.
2. Closely control changes.
3. Permit multi-year funding.
References
3, 4, 6, 12, 102, 112,
128, 120, 207, 209
220, 225
3, 6, 58, 73, 74, 107,
171, 220
3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 60,
107, 128, 209, 229,
230
4. Bar budgetary changes to major programs.
5. Reduce layering and formal steps in the
DSARC process; clarify decision authority/
responsibil ity.
6. Avoid program interruptions which alter
the manufacturer's learning curve.
6, 13, 74, 217, 128
2, 3, 4, 6, 105, 124,








X Perceive same improvement. Need hard data
to support.
X
FFG example — much improved over past per
BIW.
X No progress due to cancellation ceiling
limitation of $5M. Can anticipate progress
if HR 745 passes. Should orchestrate strong
lobbying effort.
X Not implemented.




Issue 4: Capital Investment/Industrial Mobilization Base
Recommendations : References
1. Emphasize facilities capital investment as 12, 60, 51, 103, 107,
the profit basis instead of estimated cost. 128, 157, 209, 225
2. Consider allowing interest as a contract 103, 107, 157, 225,
cost to encourage capital investment. 226, 128, 229, 230, 231
3. Encourage investment by: 11, 13, 107, 209
128, 229, 230
- Expediting government paying cycle
- Enforcing consistent application of
tailored Economic Price Adjustment
clauses
- Assuring FSD contractor a significant
proportion of production.
4. Increase emphasis on Manufacturing Technology 3, 11, 12, 13, 102,
Program and phase out obsolete machine tool 107, 128, 209
base.
5. Upgrade government-owned machine tool base. 11, 13, 107, 209
6. Increase emphasis on assuring effective 11, 13, 107, 128, 209
and appropriate strategic and critical
materials supplies.
7. 000 should confirm the number of naval 63
shipyards required to support projected work-
loads, establish specific modernization ob-
jectives for each shipyard, and approve









Some progress has been made although pre-
dominant perception is business as usual.
Despite ASN/CNM initiatives - little or no
progress.
No progress.
JLC effort underway - little progress.
Perennial issue - never able to be resolved,
1-8






1. A standard system for preparing, maintaining
retaining and transmitting configuration and
estimating data for GFE items should be
furnished.
55




Issue 6: Contract Negotiations/Proposal Evaluation/Source Selection
Recommendations: References
j
1. Formulate policy to reduce downward pressures
on program estimates.
1, 3, 4, 6, 12, 61,
209 (79 DS8), 218
j
2. Downgrade unreal istical ly low-priced pro-
posals.
1, 3, 4, 6, 61
•
3. Eliminate procedures which lead to "auction-
ing" technical transfusion and "best and
final."
6




5. Simplify source selection procedures. 12, 65, 209
:








GFE world is in disarray,
each systems command.
GFE world is in disarray,
each systems command.
Need GFE Czar in
Need GFE Czar in
Endemic problem - no progress.
Minimal progress. No broad scale implemen-
tation. Limited application/unconfirmed
outcome.
Four-step supposed to cure this problem.
Industry perceives process not being
used effectively.
Not aware of this being done anywhere.
CNM study done but hasn't gone beyond that!
Perception is: cost of proposed eval/source
selection is too high in relation to bene-
fits derived therefrom. Believe decision
could be made faster. Should base decisions
more on past track record. Big problem.
Don't have good data on track record (frag-
mented—no good data base available to all
SYSCOMS)
Little evidence to indicate this is being
done routinely.
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Issue 7: Contract Changes/Contract Administration
Recommendations : References
1. Develop baseline costs; changes by written 6, 58
direction.
2. Use DAR(ASPR) "changes" and "notification 60
of changes" clause in lieu of Navy pro-
curement circular 18.
3. Request ful ly-pricad contract changes only 60
when all ramification of change can be
predicted.
4. Intensify training in contract adminis- 61, 116, 125
tration.
5. Raise RAN/D&F, RSD/procurement thresholds. 4, 6, 12, 13, 128,
217, 230
6. Expand use of multi-year funding/authori- 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 60
zation. 107, 128, 207, 209
7. Make maximum use of contractors existing
management system.










Perception is that this is improving.
Probably as outgrowth of claims situation.
Don't know. Need data.
Don't know status. Need data.
Don't know status. Need data,
See Issue #1-5.
See Issue #1-5.
In concurrence with established policy.
Don't know real status. Need to look at
number of contractors certified to 7000.2
and trends.
Perennial recommendation. Almost impossible
to determine status. Industry says Navy
requesting far more than necessary.
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Issue 8: NATO FMS
Recommendations : References
1. Establish procedures to ensure that appro- 8, 113, 122, 207
priate NATO-wide interoperability criteria
and T&E requirements are included in U.S.
requirements documenting element needs
statements, RFP's and implementing con-
2. For co-development and co-production of weapon 8, 113, 122
systems with NATO, international competition
should be the basis for international coopera-
tion.
3. Oevelop expertise and data base to deal with 102, 122, 123
analysis of multi-national acquisitions.
4. NATO should develop an organization which can 208
plan and direct its standardization efforts
taking into account differences in perceived
weaponry needs and in cost effectiveness among
NATO nations.
5. Consider direct sale approach for U.S. con- 113, 122
tractors engaged in coproduction programs
(i.e., remove them from foreign military
sales procedures).
6. Submit coproduction Memoranda of Understanding 113
to Congress for concurrence.
7. Establish executive department group to 122
develop changes in procurement policy and







Strong policy statement exists already in
DODD 5000.1 not carried out. People at
working level in SYSCOMS pay no attention
to it. Probably just as well--they are not
in position to influence degree of imple-
mentation very much. Tough problem. If
you police process to make this happen,
acquisition times will double again!
Strong policy statement exists already in
DODD 5000.1 not carried out. People at
working level in SYSCOMS pay no attention
to it. Probably just as well --they are not
in position to influence degree of imple-
mentation very much. Tough problem. If
you police process to make this happen,
acquisition times will double again!
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1. Improve Government/contractor relationship by
ennunciating aims of the "engagement concept."
6, 225, 226,
227, 228, 229
2. Emphasize teamwork /equity in acquisition process
versus win-lose relationship.
2, 209, 128, 225,
226, 227, 228,
229
Issue 10: Cost Accounting Standards
,
Recommendations:
1. Reevaluate cost accounting standards to eliminate
unnecessarily burdensome requirements.
72, 107, 119, 128,
209, 226
Issue 11: Approval /Provisional Approval for Service Use
Recommendations:
1. Eliminate approval for service use. 217 ™
1-15
SOME ALMOST




X Not an action that can be taken by CNM
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Iss ue 12: Utility of 6.1, 6.2 Programs
Recommendations :
1. Terminate 6.2 program which do not have a definite
mission need.
References
Issue 13: Decision Delays
Recommendations :
1. Management systems should be streamlined and external 65, 226
demands should be reduced to enable personnel to
concentrate on the important problems.
2. Strip out staff elements which have become operational. 6
3. OSD pull back from managing service detail. 6, 226
Issue 14: Management Reserves
Recommendations :
1. Establish managment reserve account for each
Project Manager.




















Issue Title : l.a. Faulty Business Strategy
Problem Description : Many Cost Growth problems occur because of an ill
conceived business acquisition strategy
Conclusion : Definitely a problem. Specific examples:
contractors "buy in" during development with plans
to recoup later
carrying multiple contractor involvement too long
during development
competition forcing contractors to stretch
technology over optimistically
competition forcing low early production price
quotes which later increase significantly
overly optimistic business base for distribution
of contract overhead
Recommendation : Acquisition strategies must be structured and
reviewed more carefully. A109 suggests competition
1-19
only where it is appropriate and helpful. The wisdom
of carrying multiple contractors during development,
particularly when the concept and the technology
being pursued are similar, is highly questionable.
On the other hand, competition among technologically
different concepts - in pursuit of a mission need has
merit. Competition as a cost determinant during
advanced development is situational; in any event,
more thought about the business situation needs to be
done in structuring and implementing business
strategy, contract negotiations, and contractor
performance monitoring.
Recommendations
• issue CNM directive for Acquisition Strategies
t institutionalize the process for development,
review and approval of acquisition strategies to
assume business management is being carefully
integrated.
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• Assign a CNM senior civilian (charged to HQNAVMAT
ceiling) assigned to each SYSCOM commander who
would:
- expedite strategies through system and take
approval action for the CNM
- act as an acquisition and business advisor to
the SYSCOM Commander, and institute business
management training programs within the SYSCOM.
- become a repository of NAVMAT-wide corporate
knowledge
- rotate every two years among SYSCOMS/major
PMs/Navy Secretariat/OSMC
Backup Material Industry Interviews
0MB Circular A-109 (Ref. 1)
OSB 1977 Summer Study (Ref. 4)
OSB 1979 Summer Study (Ref 12)
RAND Report: Acquisition Policy Effectiveness
(Ref. 74)
1-21
GAO: Acquisition Practices (Ref. 106'
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tIssue Title: l.b. Multi-year advantages not exploited.
Problem Description: Multiyear procurement is not effectively utilized
due to congressional ly mandated termination
liability ceiling of $5M.
Conclusion: Problem is well understood and documented in
various reports. HR 745 has been introduced to
solve the problem.
Recommendation: Lobby strongly for passage of HR 745 (submitted
6 Jan 1981).




FMC material on cost of program stretch-out and low
production rate.
HASC Report (Ref 128)
Industry Interviews
DSB 1977 Summer Study (Ref. 4)





General Slay's testimony (Ref. 107]
Defense Industry, J. Gansler (Ref. 214]
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Issue Title : I.e. OMB Circular A109
Problem Description : There is a perception among project managers that OMB
A109 as invoked by DODD 5000.1 requires programs to
be planned according to serial milestones, and that
up-front competitive concept formulation should
involve the maximum number of contractors as possible
within the available resources. Ther serial approach
is very time consuming, competition especially
throughout the entire development period very
expensive, and the true cost of concept formulation
usually substantially exceeds available funding.
Further, for a given competitive concept formulation
strategy we seldom properly fund a credible program
and therefore decrease the probability of defining a
least life cycle cost set of alternatives. Our
experience with A 109 programs has been dismal—money
has been wasted with programs cancelled and others
drastically restructured.
Conclusion s: • A-109 is not intelligently implemented (we have no
successful A109 programs)
• We waste money through early program turbulence
caused by pseudo competition
Recommendation: That CNM firmly articulate, in a widely distributed
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set of management principles, the following:
PM's ensure that required front-end investment is
or will be forthcoming when embarking on a program
structure that calls for an extensive competitive
concept formulation
At no time should PM's take it upon themselves to
force-fit program planning to an unrealistic
profile, particularly one where up-front funding
is inadequate
PM's should consider a limited concept formulation
involving industry and government leading to a
specific concept for pursuit in the next phase
Maximum tailoring must be pursued, for example:
From concept formulation, proceeding directly into
Engineering Development with provision for limited
production preceeding Milestone III
Competition should be applied only when there is
clear benefit— therefore its use should be
justified. It should never be used just for
appearances sake.
Backup Material: DSB Summer Study 1977 (Ref. 4)
1-26
Report of the Commission on Government Procurement
(Ref 2)
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Issue Title: l.d. Inadequate specifications
Problem Description : Industry alleges that Navy RFPs are frequently
neither clear nor concise. They may be far too
detailed, confused, or lack clarity. This results in
cost proposals that inherently have a wide variance
between what industry is selling and what the Navy
thinks it is buying.
Conclusion: Frequently a problem.
Recommendation: Strengthen RFP review process at SYSCOM levels.
SYSCOM acquisition executives, (e.g. SEA 90 AIR 05,
ELEX 05) must institute periodic RFP review and
approval procedures to assure RFPs define specific
products for which reliable industry cost proposals
can be prepared. HQNAVMAT should police on a
sampling basis.
Backup Material Report of Commission on Government Procurement
Industry Interviews
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Issue Title : I.e. Risk assessment /rewards
Problem Description : Industry alleges that quite often rewards (profits)
are not commensurate with risk in government
programs, and that the more risk inherent in the
contract, the higher the contract cost must become.
Therefore it is axiomatic: Risk is money. Further,
industry expresses concern with the AF use of total
package procurement and use of FFP contracts as an
attempt to place almost all the risk upon the
contractor. As a counterpoint, some industry reps
assert that contract type really makes no difference
and that other factors are more significant.
Conclusion : This issue is probably industry dependent, however,
evidence suggests that anticipated profits are not
commensurate with risks; substantial initial risk is
reflected by higher costs and is a contributor to
schedule delays.
Recommendation : • When feasible, defer high-risk elements to
pre-planned product improvement.
s Provide PM management reserve so that risk areas
can be managed.
» For identified high risk areas, carry in parallel,
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a fall-back position of low risk but of lessor
capability. Budget accordingly.
9 Source selection criteria should put technical
risk in its proper context.
• Whenever feasible shift toward greater use of
award fee type contracts.
Backup Material . NASA and U.S. Army experience with award fee type
contracts.
.
GAO Reports (Ref 103)
.
Gen. Slay's testimony (Ref. 102)
.
DSB 1979 Summer Study (Ref 12)
.
DSB 1980 Summer Study (Ref. 11)





Issue Title: 2. a. Government inability to handle higher than
budgeted inflation (inflation rate stipulated by 0MB!
Problem Description: 0MB specifies an inflation rate that executive
agencies must use for budget-planning purposes. In
recent years this planning rate has been less than
the actual inflation rate as measured by standard
indices (e.g. CPI). This has led to budget dollar
figures being less than actual dollar requirements.
This shortfall is aggravated because DOD has
apparently been experiencing actual inflation
significantly greater than that measured by the CPI,
Conclusion: OMB-mandated rate causes an understated program
budget baseline and hence is a significant part of
program cost growth.
Recommendation: Use management reserve for accomodating variance
between actual inflation, and 0MB rates. Expedite




0MB Circular A-109 (Ref. 1)
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1972 COGP (Ref . 2]
OSB 1977 Summer Study (Ref. 4)
0S8 1979 Summer Study (Ref 12)
NMARC (Ref. 6)
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Issue Title : 2.b. Self Fulfilling Prophecy Syndrome
Problem Description : Subject to conditions of the competitive environment,
contractors propose to their perception of what is
available in the budget. Therefore the budget
becomes a self fulfilling prophecy. If it is too
low, cost growth is inevitable. If it is too high,
the proposed effort may be overstated. There .are
government officials who feel that lower budgets will
tend to discourage bids at higher prices and overtly
budget low for this and other reasons (e.g.
government program "buy- in").
Price is a function of many factors: labor and
material, overhead, G & A, facilitazation, IR&D/B&P,
profit. In order to meet a low budget, the
contractor has some latitude to adjust price
dependent upon contract type. For example for FFP
all of the foregoing can be altered; for cost
reimbursable contracts, overhead, G&A, IR&D/B&P
flexibility is constrained.
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For a variety of reasons, contractors may bid a price
below their own costs which puts them in a loss
position. Eventually this loss must be recovered in
the form of cost growth, contract changes, cost of
doing business on other programs (e.g., commercial
work), decrease in capital investment, or loss of
financial stature.
Conclusion : The self fulfilling prophecy is real.
1. A high budget profile results in higher initial
program costs but probably lower cost growth
throughout program execution.
2. A low budget profile is likely to result in lower
contract expenditures at the outset at the expense of
large potential cost growth later in the program and
therefore a higher probability of program
cancelation. A number of recent Navy programs can be
cited as examples.
Recommendation : • CNM issue a management principle to budget to the
most realistic funding profile.
• That NAVMAT procedures be set up to insure that:
(1) the Navy's internal cost estimates be as
accurate as possible and (2) that these accurate
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cost estimates be available to all concerned
parties (cost evaluators of bids, contract
negotiators, MAT 016, MAT 08 etc.). The ultimate
goal is to discipline the system so that all Navy





Issue Title : 2.c. Proposal evaluation/source selection driven by
price competition
Problem Description : Industry strongly believes that price is the dominant
factor in source selection and therefore is compelled
to bid low. This practice is termed "buy-in" and
leads to artifically low contract prices which
inevitably result in cost growth (in a fashion
analagous to that described in issue 2.b.).
Conclusion : Industry is convinced of their perception and they
must be persuaded that price is not the dominant
selection factor for development contracts. This
should stimulate more realistic cost proposals.
Recommendation : 1. Strengthen selection criteria to provide greater
recognition for good past cost performance.
2. Modify criteria to substitute cost credibility
for absolute cost.
3. An example of departure from past cost emphasis











Contract negotiations should be based upon a
knowledgeable Navy cost estimate. Significant
contractor variances must be carefully rationalized,
Backup Material : 0MB Circular A-109 (Ref. 1)
DSB 1977 Summer Study (Ref. 4)




Issue Title: 2.d. Too many
programs/resources spread too thin
Problem Description: Sponsors' attempt to
fund too many programs within a
constrained budget. This results in funding
profiles
which are structured to keep programs
funded at the
keep-alive level, albeit a grossly diseconomic
strategy.
Conclusion: This practice is a prime
cause of cost growth through
arbitrary and diseconomic budget profile as
discussed
in preceeding issues.
Recommendation: SYSCOMs must develop
realistic cost projections. CNM
should permit program execution only within
realistic
funding profiles. This will require
identification
of low priority programs as candidates for
reprogramming by CNM.
Backup Material Industry Interviews
0MB Circular A- 109
DSB 1977 Summer Study (Ref. 4)
OSB 1979 Summer Study (Ref. 12)
GAO Reports (Refs. 105, 111 through 127)
General Slay's Testimony (Ref. 107)
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Issue Title : 2.e. Design to Cost/Affordability
Problem Description : While design-to-cost as a concept appears to have
merit, its principles have not been uniformly or
effectively applied within the Naval Material
Command, However NAVMAT experience has not
conclusively substantiated its value. A JLC
committee is meeting to review this issue at present.
Conclusion : Design to cost has not been adequately exploited
within NAVMAT.
Recommendation : 1. Review results of JLC committee effort and adjust
NAVMAT policy accordingly.
2. SYSCOMs/PMs assure that DTC has been considered
in the acquisition strategy, and is used when
trade-offs between cost and performance or different
concepts for the same performance can be made. This
implies use of the concept early in the acquisition
cycle. Therefore the trade-off process must be able
to accommodate uncertainty in projected production
quantities.
3. HQNAVMAT, on a sampling basis, monitor NAVMAT
performance in the DTC area.
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3. PROGRAM TURBULENCE
Issue Title : 3. a. Funding/Perturbations
Problem Description : Because of the annual budgeting cycle and various
perceptions of "need", program buy quantities and
schedules change frequently from year to year and
sometimes change within a particular budget year.
Also, funding is changed throughout the year because
of defferals and budget reductions and reprogramming
actions instituted at various government levels.
Conclusion : Funding/perturbation clearly drives up program cost.
A subset of the issue is delay and disruption. A
secondary effect is a disincentive for capital
improvement due to the inability to reliably predict
future market. This negatively impacts the
industrial base.
Recommendation : CNM take a firm stand with OP-090 to protect program
funding from perturbation.
Require NAVMAT staff to resolve all OSD/ASN deferrals
before the beginning of the fiscal year.
Delegate 70-80% of ACAT 1, 2 and 3 programs to the
CNM as acquisition executive in order to increase
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efficient execution of authorized programs
Backup Material OSB 1977 Summer Study (Ref. 4)
DSB 1979 Summer Study (Ref. 12)
NMARC (Ref. 6)
General Slay's Testimony (Ref. 107)
Senate Report (Gov't. Ops.) (Ref. 101)
HASC Report (Ref 128)
Industry Interviews
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Issue Title : 3.b. Peaks and Valleys in Contractor Workload
Problem Description : Industry argues that changes and uncertainties in
program funding lead to workload fluctuations
resulting in higher costs, wasted resources (due to
deadtitne), and a lack of incentive to invest in
capital equipment. Also, Navy motivates the
contractor to plan the program to fit "non-linear"
budget profiles, thereby making peaks and valleys an
inherent part of the program.
Conclusion : Substantial evidence supports the contention that
workload fluctuations are a major contributor to cost
growth. Fluctuations disrupt the entire planning,
program execution process and contribute to
productivity loss.
Recommendations : . 3. a recommendations apply.
. Assuming ability to award multiyear contracts,
solicit proposals from contractors based on
varying workload schedules (Have them price out
the work at a rate that fits their capacity
best). Make that rate a key evaluation factor in
competitive negotiations.
. Capacity and efficient production rates are
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different for each contractor. They must be
optimized individually as a function of present
and planned workload.
Backup Material : Industry interviews
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Issue Title : 3.c. Uneconomical Production Rates.
Problem Description : "Buy" rates are very often so low that the contractor
can not achieve the most economical production. As a
result, unit costs are frequently higher than they
should be. Causes of this problem include
Congressional ly mandated production quantities,
"Warm" production line budgeting, and poor Navy
planning, especially during transition from
development to production.
Conclusion : This is a real problem that is conceptually different
than the problem of fluctuating buy rates. Here the
argument is that higher annual buy rates would lead
to lower unit costs. Much evidence supports this
thesis.
Recommendation : . Base budget projections on economical buy rates
and program accordingly. Immediately apply to
expendable weapons for which the Navy is
significantly below inventory objective.
. Base budget projections on economical buy rates
and program accordingly.
Backup Material : DSB 1977 Summer Study (Ref. 4)
DSB 1979 Summer Study (Ref. 12)
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DSB 1980 Summer Study (Ref. 11)
NMARC (Ref. 6)
General Slay's Testimony (Ref. 107)
GAO Reports (Ref. 103, 111, 127)
Industry interviews
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4. CAPITAL INVESTMENT/INDUSTRY BASE MOBILIZATION
Issue Title : 4. a. Cost of money
Problem Description : Within the current high interest economy,
disallowance of interest as an allowable cost reduces
profit below that previously experienced by defense
industry, especially since profit guidelines have not
changed. This has two implications:
- shift from defense to commercial business
- decrease in available funds for facilitazation.
Conclusion : The situation is clearly inducing an adverse effect
on the defense industrial /mobilization base. Needed
defense-oriented capital format ion /investment is
lagging substantially behind private sector
investment.
Recommendation : . Navy request OSD to recommend legislative actions
to make interest which is allowable to
facilitization an allowable cost; also draft a
bill accordingly.
. CNM issue an NCD to consider facilitization during
profit negotiations.
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BackuD Material . Previous ASPR cases on changing legislation to
permit interest to be regarded as an allowable
cost.
GAO Reports
General Slay's Testimony (Ref 10)
OSB 1979 Summer Study (Ref 12)





Issue Title: 4b. On again/off again programs
Problem Description : On again-off again programs add substantially to the
cost of doing business (B&P, investment costs,
planning and marketing) with the government.
Millions of dollars, both industry and government,
are consumed pursuing programs with a low probability
of ever getting completed. An analogous situation
exists where the government advertises potential new
starts that never materialize or solicits
"unsolicited proposals."
Conclusion: Truly a problem and must be solved as part-and-parcel
of bringing greater stability and discipline to the
acquisition process.
Recommendation: CNM should not permit advertising or execution of
programs lacking either formal documentation or
funding.
Backup Material Industry interviews
Defense Industry, J. Gansler (Ref 214)
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Issue Title: 4.c. Productivity Enhancement
Problem Description : Industry argues that as long as profit rates are low
on defense work that budget projections are unstable,
and the government refuses to make long term
committments via multi-year contracts, then it is
risky to invest company funds in capital equipment.
Also, the Navy has not been effective in implementing
manufacturing technology programs, investing in new
equipment for NIROPS, or motivating improvement
through the Value Engineering Program. One reason
why profits, as a return on investment, is so high is
that investment is so low!
Conclusion: Argument is basically correct.
Recommendation: Revitalize the Navy Value Engineering Program in some
form (see issue 7.e)
CNM continue current MT initiatives
CNM develop a plan for NIROP facility improvement and
implement in a timely and well -supported fashion.
Backup Material GAO Reports
General Slay's Testimony (Ref 102)
DSB 1979 Summer Study (Ref 12)
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DSB 1980 Sumner Study (Ref 11)
The Defense Industry, J. Gansler (Ref 214)
Industry Interviews
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Issue Title : 4.d. Inventory versus mobilization capability
Problem Description : Lack of funding resources causes defense executives
to make resource allocation decisions based on
maximizing short range payoff. Most military
managers feel obliged to invest in current inventory
(expendables and finished goods) rather than the
mobilization base (plant/equipment) for longer term
payoff
.
Conclusion : Short range payoff decision making contributes to
overall program cost growth because plant and
equipment deteriorates further and productivity
either remains constant or declines.
The outlook for increased funding directed toward
plant/equipment modernization is not bright.
The lack of funds earmarked specifically for
plant/equipment modernization means that short range,
current inventory decisions must serve, where
feasible, as a source of funding to modernize
plant/equipment.
Recommendation : Ensure that plant/equipment modernization
considerations are factored heavily into decisions
concerning investment in current inventory needs.
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Address in acquisition strategy
Pursue support improvement for NIROPS (discussed in
preceding issue)
Pursue investment tax credits
Manufacturing technology (discussed in preceding
issue)
Backup Material : HASC report on Defense Industrial Base (Ref 128)
The Defense Industry, J. Gansler (Ref 214)
Industry Interviews
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5. GFE/CFE TRADE OFFS
Issue Title: 5. a. Contractor Warranties
Problem Description : Evidence exists that warranty opportunities are not
being exploited.
GFE/CFE tradeofs if not skillfully done can operate
at cross purposes with contractor warranty provisions,
Conclusion: Navy is only moderately effective in evaluating and
administering GFE/CFE tradeoffs with respect to
warranty considerations.
Point of greatest leverage to perform GFE/CFE
tradeoffs effectively is at stage of developing and
approving the program acquisition strategy.
Recommendation: SYSCOMs/PMs ensure that warranty considerations are
factored heavily into GFE/CFE tradeoff decision
making process, reflected in the acquisition
strategy, and factored into contracts as appropriate.
Backup Material USNPGS Montery papers on Reliability Improvement
Warranties (RIW).




Issue Title : 5„b. Storage/Obsolesence Costs
Problem Description : GFE/CFE decisions if not made properly and on timely
basis can cause cost growth through
storage/obsolesence cost factors.
Conclusion : Cost growth attributable to GFE/CFE
storage/obsolesence factors can be minimized through
improved planning and accelerated decision making.
More timely/accelerated decisions can occur if fewer
persons are involved in the decision making process.
Recommendation : (1) Address effective planning for this issue in
acquisition strategy.
(2) Speed up decision making by granting contracting
officer authority to some project managers this is
described in detail in the executive summary. This
could be tested on a pilot plan basis with SYSCOMs
and MAT 08 tracking progress and success of pilot
plan.
(2) Centralize decision making to a greater extent
within project offices. (Reduce the number of people
involved in any given decision trade off session.)
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Backup Material : NMARC (Ref 6)
Navy Ship Process Study (Ref 60)
Industry Interviews
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Issue Title: 5.c. System/Subsystem Design Drivers and Total
System Integration
Problem Description : System/subsystem tradeoffs are among the most
difficult of those involved in developing and
acquiring weapon systems. Proper trade off decision
making entails a full understanding of the pros and
cons of subsystem design driving system design. Many
persons who should, do not understand fully such
issues and trade offs.
Decisions are made based on less than adequate data
and/or understanding of the issues/tradeoffs; and
costs are incurred that might have been avoided.
Quite often, when system integration has been
contracted out, the PM tends to lose sight of many
detailed issues which if assiduously managed could
avoid cost growth .
Conclusion: Certain cost growth can be avoided/minimized through
improved planning, enlightened and accelerated
decisionmaking.
More timely, accelerated decisions can occur if fewer
persons are involved in the decision making process.
Recommendation Centralize decisionmaking to a greater extent within
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project offices and avoid contracting-out of analysis
for subsystem and system integration trade-offs;
eliminate supervisory layering; assure PM/acquisition
managers report through the most austere
chain-of-command.
The acquisition strategy should specifically address
the preferred approach to systems integration.
Encourage selection/decisions based on analysis of
military utility compared to life-cycle cost.
1-58
Issue Title : 5.d. GFE and Standardization
Problem Description : Cost growth has occurred or costs have been incurred
needlessly due to faulty GFE/CFE standardization
decisions.
Conclusion : This complex issue is often neglected in favor of
expediency to simplify project management and get on
with other program problems. It is easier to make
something CFE than to go through the effort of
developing a standard piece of GFE. However, the
advantages of GFE are many:
(1) The government does not have to pay the
additional G&A and profit levied by a prime contractor
if the item were CFE (the government costs associated
with procurment of GFE are acknowledged as somewhat
offsetting).
(2) The GFE can easily be standardized with all
of the attendent benefits that accrue, e.g.
(a) Standard documentation
(b) Ease of training
(c) Simplification of the logistics
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support base.
(3) Risk in overall system design is
significantly decreased since the prime contractor is
dealing with a known entity. He can focus attention
on those parts of the system which indeed are the
high risk areas. Significant cost savings can accrue
by adopting a policy which favors more GFE and
standardized product lines. Savings will accrue: on
prime contracts due to avoidance of G&A/profit on
what would have been GFE; and as a result of
decreased contractor technical risk. Indirect
savings will accrue relative to simplification of
logistics support and military training.
Recommendation : CNM adopt a vigorous policy of GFE/standardization
for multi-application items to be produced in high
quantity. Establish policy as a CNM objective with
quarterly progress reporting required. Police
implementation through review of APs/Acquisition
strategy documents.
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Backup Material : . Report of the Commission on Government Procurment
(Ref. 2)
. GAO Reports (Ref. Ill, 112, 115)
. NRAC (Ref. 78)
. Industry Interviews
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CNM Issue Title: 5.e. Data Procurement
Problem Description : Extra cost results from specification and procurement
of unnecessary data. Mil specs are specified when
commercial practice might suffice, and
extraordinarily detailed data is procured based on
the presumption that it is needed for reprocurement
from a subsequent, "second" source. Yet the
deliverables are seldom reviewed in detail, or
accurate to the extent that they can be used for
reprocurement of identical items.
Conclusion: Tradition concerning procurement of detailed data
contributes to program cost.
Potential Cost can be avoided/minimized through
improved understanding of the tradeoffs involved and
through rational treatment of the issue during
development of the basic acquisition strategy.
Recommendation: SYSCOMs/PMs adopt philosophy that it is better to err
on side of acquiring too little data rather than too
much, i.e. "zero base" the data package.
Backup Material Report of the Commission on Government Procurement
(Ref. 2)
. NAVMAT Industry Roundtable (Ref. 3)
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. Defense Industry, J. Gansler (Ref. 214)
. Industry Interviews
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6. Contract Negotiations, Proposal Evaluation, and Source Selection
Issue Title: 6. a. Previous cost experience is not usually used by
negotiating team
Problem Description : Problem is twofold: (a), hard data are not available
or (b) unused if available. In either event,
contract terms, costs, prices are not negotiated as
expertly as they should be.
Conclusion: The problem is real and can be fixed,
It is a management problem that the SYSCOMS work on
continually but have yet to solve satisfactorily.
Recommendation: Initial negotiating position should be based upon a
knowledgeable cost analysis which uses previous cost
experience as a major influence. Policy should be
enforced (policed) in prenegotiation clearance review
by CNM or SYSCOM staff as appropriate.
Backup Material Interviews with: Government Personnel (HQ's,
Industrial Reps., etc.) Industry Personnel
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Issue Title: 6.b. Government negotiating teams not as well
prepared as industry in area of cost and pricing
analysis.
Problem Description : Personnel system generally precludes staffing Navy
contracting offices with personnel of grades and
talent comparable to industry counterparts with whom
they must deal. The general impression among
government and industry is that Navy contract
negotiators have declined in expertise in the area of
cost and pricing analyss and equitable adjustment
capability.
Conclusion Evidence indicates that this is a real problem that
needs treatment.
Recommendation: Increase use/number of non-supervisory contract
negotiators.
Educate contract personnel regarding economics of
capital investment, prof it generation, and cost
analysis. Integrate this aspect into the MPS
objectives.
Backup Material Report of Commission on Government Procurement
(Ref. 2)
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Profit 76 (Ref )
NAVAIR paper on non-supervisory contract negotiators
(1978) (Ref. )
Interviews with government and industry contract
personnel
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Issue Title: 6.c. Undue focus on profit when labor and material
are far more important cost drives.
Problem Description : This situation contributes to cost growth in a
tangential way. One can argue that government
negotiators take a narrow view toward industry's
needs/goals concerning capital investment and
profit. By concentrating negotiations on profit,
they drive profit down unreasonably, thereby
impacting negatively the entire capital investment
picture upon which a healthy defense posture depends
Conclusion: Attitudes and actions of contracting personnel in the
government need to be altered toward recognizing how
the incentives of profit and capital investment in a
private enterprise system really work.
Recommendation: Establish as an element of the overall MBO program.
Establish and carry out an appropriate training
program.




Issue Title : 6.d. Profit and G&A pyramiding in subcontract area.
Problem Description : Profit and G&A pyramiding occurs when a prime
contractor extensively subcontracts. Subcontracts
can be for material, labor, or other services. This
issue also bears on the acquisition strategy for the
question of Prime/Sub versus associative contractors
for large complicated programs. One must recognize
that since associative contractors usually require a
system integrator, the costs of the Prime/Sub versus
associative arrangement could very well be
equivalent. To ameliorate the pyramiding problem,
primes could procure material for their subcontractors
Conclusion : For most situations, this issue is not considered to
be a significant total cost driver. Efforts to
restrict subcontracting may be self-defeating in the
larger context of cost growth. However, economic
efficiencies may be gained when GFE is used, or when
the prime provides subs with material in a "GFE"
fashion. Economies to be gained must be carefully
calculated, and recognized as situational, before
prime versus associative decisions are made. Also,
contractor make or buy proposals must be more than
superficially reviewed as part of to the contracting
process.
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Recommendation : Acknowledge issue as situational and factor with
acquisition strategy; assure make or buy plan makes
sense.
Backup Material : Commission on Government Procurement (Ref. 2)
DSB 1979 Summer Study (Ref. 12)
DSB 1980 Summer Study (Ref. 11)
General Slay's Testimony (Ref. 107)
HASC Report (Ref 128)
Defense Industry, J. Gansler (Ref 214)
Profit 76 (Ref. )
Industry Interviews
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Issue Title : 6.e. Improper use of DCAA/DCAS evaluations.
Problem Description : Contracting community will not make a move without
DCAA/DCAS input. DCAA/DCAS input takes undue amount
of time, is costly, and often perfunctory in nature.
Contracting community frequently asks for "full
blown" reports out of DCAA/DCAS when a much less
detailed "bring up" report would suffice. (A "bring
up" report is one that "brings one up to date" from
the time the last full blown report was done).
The contracting community is often more concerned
with playing it safe and covering all bases than
getting on with it. There is an "overprotective"
syndrome at work in most contracts shops.
People do not get kudos or promotions by shortcutting
the system. When they try, they are accused either
of being in the pocket of some contractor who will
benefit, or as being reckless. Consequently, the
itme it takes for contracting is lengthened. Since
time is money this situation contributes to higher
price.
Conclusion : There is no real sense of urgency or responsiveness
that can be observed (lots of frenetic activity but
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lots of wheel-spinning at same time).
Recommendation : Reduce reliance on DCAA/DCAS and substitute increased
responsibility and authority on the part of
contracting officers.
Move toward making contracting officers exert more
decision-making authority vice coordinating the
opinions and input of scores of other people.
Accelerate decision making by reducing the number of
persons involved in any single decision making
situation.
Establish the above as elements of the overall MBO
program. Track progress, promote the competent and
fire the incompetent.
Backup Material : Industry and NAVPRO interviews.
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Issue Title: 6.f. Accelerate Proposal evaluation time.
Problem Description : Long, drawn out proposal evaluation cycles place
contractors in limbo position of having to either
disband the team that has been formed or hold it
together in anticipation of contract award, spending
B&P or company funds. Most RFPs require the winner
to hit the ground running upon award and, as a
result, subsequent schedule dates are generally
optimistic — which does not accommodate much start
up slippage.
Conclusion: The situation is common and is a hidden driver of
cost growth.
Recommendation: Cut proposal evaluation times by establishing a CNM
goal to complete proposal evaluation and make an
award in period of time equal to time contractors are
given to prepare proposals. (Now it frequently takes
two or three times longer to evaluate the proposals
than it did to originate them.
NAVMAT staff track progress and report to CNM during
corporate reviews.
Where politically prudent, streamline source
selection process; e.g., make chairman SSEB the SSAC
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or make chairman SSAC the SSA.




7. Contract Changes/Contract Administration
Issue Title : 7. a. Timely adjudication of changes
Problem Description : Particularly in shipbuilding in particular, the prime
contract is estimated and priced out down only to
about the third level of a 7 or 8 level work
breakdown structure.
When subsequent changes occur that affect levels of
the work breakdown structure below that for which
estimates were made originally, there is no baseline
against which to negotiate/price out the change.
Adjudicating the changes that do occur is a time
consuming process. This is a problem that can
consume undue amounts of analysis and administrative
time that in the final analysis is probably non
productive. The issues of "ripple effect" and delay
and disruption are involved. There are scores of
attorneys both in industry and government who derive
their living from trying to solve (or not solve) this
problem. This all adds to cost growth in one way or
another ~ too often it shows up in the form of a
claim after the fact.
Conclusion: This is a real problem that needs treatment.
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Recommendation : SYSCOMs enforce policy of adjudicating changes as
quickly as possible. Agree on an amount, put it to
bed and get on with it.
In order to avoid changes being compounded, delegate
SUPSHIPS and Field reps more authority to resolve and
approve changes.
Use technique of government agreeing to make fast
decision and pay for change quickly in return for
contractor's releasing government from any subsequent
claims derived from that change.
Backup Material NAVSEA contract Administration manual (Engagement
philosophy).
NAVMAT study on cost of pricing out changes (1970).
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Issue Title : 7.b. Constructive changes (volume of incidence and
level of organization).
Problem Description : Constructive changes are informal directions, given
to the contractor upon which he acts and subsequently
charges the Navy for doing so!
Changes are inherent in the way the Navy does
business. When they occur they add up to cost growth
in the form of adjudicated changes or claims.
Long experience demonstrates that it is unrealistic
to assume that constructive changes can be totally
stopped.
Conclusion : Management attention should be directed toward
adjudicating such changes quickly so that the cost
associated with the changes is not compounded with
passage of time, and that the Navy is not put in a
position of accomodating a change which is not in its
best interest.
Recommendation : Grant contracting officer authority to certain
project managers for adjudication of claims and
affecting changes below some reasonable threshold.
Delegate increased contracting officer authority to
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SUPSHIP/NAVPRO Administrative Contracting Officer to
adjudicate changes on the spot. For those changes
that could have significant impact, allow the field
ACO to obtain a verbal approval.
Backup Material : NMARC study (Ref. 4)
Report of Commission on Government Procurement (Ref.
2)




Issue Title: 7.c. Delay, disruption and ripple effect (especially
in shipbuilding).
Problem Description: Delay, disruption, and ripple effect occur most
frequently in shipbuilding when the shipbuilder is
constructing several ships at once. When the Navy
mandates a- change to one contract, the contractor
frequently shifts work force (certain skill trades)
from one ship to another which impacts both
contracts. The net effect is for the Navy to be
charged for delay, disruption, and ripple effect
against contract "B" due to changes mandated against
contract "A".
Conclusion: The only practical solution to minimizing delay,
disruption and ripple effect is to absolutely
minimize change orders. When change orders must be
issued they should be handled in the following order
of procedural preference:
First Preference : Preprice the change (agree
formally on the price before
commencing work)
.
Second Preference : Establish a ceiling price to
hold costs in check while
negotiating/adjudicating a
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formal priced change order.
Third Preference : Accumulate a group of changes
and adjudicate them as a
package or "batch".
It is concluded that a preponderance of changes are
handled under the second or third preference cited
above.
The longer a change situation goes unadjudicated the
harder it is to adjudicate and the greater the real
or potential cost growth.
A substantial backlog of unadjudicated changes
remains unchanged at most offices charged with
administering contracts.
Recommendation : Delegate contracting officer authority to the maximum
extent consistent with capabilities of persons so
designated.
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Implement improved procedure for spotting and
reducing the size of backlogs consisting of
unadjudicated change orders. (Consider roving "clean
up team" approach).
Backup Material : NAVMAT change pricing study 1970 (Ref. )
Ship Process Imp. Study (Ref. 60)
Industry Interviews
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Issue Title: 7.d. Cost growth as a function of unknown unknowns
(UNK/UNKS).
Problem Description : Certain changes are driven by bonafide UNK/UNKS that
simply cannot be foreseen. Provision must be made to
accomodate unforeseen change, particularly during
development. When these UNK/UNKS become known, the
PM must have the flexibility to exercise management
prerogative to quickly resolve the issues and keep
the program on schedule. Without this opportunity,
time is consumed in an effort to locate funds; the
program is delayed in schedule; and overall program
costs increase, thereby compounding the original
problem.
Conclusion: Management reaction can be speeded up by the use of
adequate management reserves, thereby avoiding
schedule delays and attendant cost growth.
Recommendation: Fix the management reserve problem (see issue #14);
CNM articulate policy that adequate management
reserves are included and justified in program
budgets.
Backup Material Commission on Government Procurement (Ref. 2)
OSB - 1977 Summer Study (Ref. 4)
DSB - 1979 Summer Study (Ref. 12)
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DSB - 1980 Summer Study (Ref. 11)
NMARC (Ref. 6)
GAO Reports (Ref. 112, 126, 127)
HASC Report (Ref 128)
Industry and Government Interviews
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Issue Title 7.e. Value engineering
Problem Description : The Navy's VE program is essentially non-functioning.
Administrative times to process VECPs are excessive.
As delays inhibit submission of VECPs, they become a
demotivator of the program..
Conclusion: The Navy, by its inaction, effectively has nullified
potential cost savings available through the VECP
process.
Recommendation: Streamline and revitalize the VECP program. Cost
savings should be defined by the VECP in terms of
Navy decision dates so that the cost of decision
delay is evident. However, as a minimum, direct that
action on VECPs be taken within 30 days after receipt.
CNM delegate approval authority to lowest practical
level (SYSCOMs or field)
Backup Material : Industry and Government Interviews
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Issue Title: 7.f. Navy Overhead cost of Contract Administration,
(audits, preaward surveys etc).
Problem Description: . The administrative requirements leading to award
of a contract or adjudication of a change order are
allowed frequently to assume an importance that is
not proportional to the end product/contract effort
concerned. (The cost of processing the contract or
the change order can exceed the cost of the hardware
effort involved).
Conclusion: The solution does not lie in adding more
administrative people to handle the administrative
workload (They create their own workload to a certain
extent)
The solution lies in delegating authority/responsibi-
lity to the lowest practical levels so decisions are
made more rapidly and on the spot
Recommendation: CNM direct a review of delegated authority and
establish a program to selectively increase level of
authority of ACO's in the field.
Backup Material Industry and Government Interviews
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8. NATO/FMS
Issue Title : 8. a. Foreign Armaments Collaboration
Problem Description : The Navy does not realize potentially substantial
benefit (except for economies of scale realized in
FMS cases) from doing business with friendly foreign
nations. Our NATO allies have demonstrated the
ability to innovate and rapidly deploy new systems.
To avoid loss of cooperative opportunities, the
following areas deserve particular attention:
a. use of the foreign technology base and R&D;
b. adoption of foreign systems already deployed;
c. reduction of overhead (logistics support) as
a result of standardization;
d. creation of a truely competitive environment
wherein there are both multiple suppliers as
well as multiple customers.
e. co-development and co-production, however,
interviews and experience indicates that
co-development and perhaps co-production are
neither time-inefficient nor economic, and that
only item (b) has merit in this regard.
Conclusion: There is no real committment within the Navy,
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perceived by acquisition managers, to entertain
foreign armaments collaboration in basic program
planning or execution. The business advantages of
such collaboration are neither understood,
determined, or factored into the program review
process at any level. Nor does the requirements
setting process motivate attention to this issue.
This lack of attention may cause the Navy to miss
opportunities for cost savings possible through
higher volume production, synergism of the technology
base, reduction of weapon system overhead, and
cooperative R&D.
Recommendation : HQNAVMAT review and concur with draft ORs/MENs to
assure foreign development is considered
NAVMAT development proposals and NDCPs should include
an alternative options which consider use of foreign
systems either currently under development or
deployed.
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HQNAVMAT and SYSCOM Acquisition Review Boards should
into account items (a) through (e) under "Problem
Description" during program reviews.
Backup Material : Defense Science Board 1978 Summer Study (Ref. 8)
GAO Reports (Refs. 113, 122)
Industry Interviews
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Issue Title : 8.b. Business Implication of Military Sales to
Foreign Customers
Problem Description : Higher production rates, and higher industry profits
can result in increased expenditures for capital
improvement, which in turn reduce unit costs. Direct
sales to foreign customers vice FMS cases usually
results in higher profit for industry. However,
government administrative obstacles burden the
process of direct sales to foreign governments.
As the Reagan Administration reviews existing arms
Transfer Control policy, some administrative
obstacles to direct sales may be lowered or removed.
Export licensing review is likely to continue, but
tight constraints upon the role of U.S. Defense and
State Department personnel in facilitating direct
sales could be loosened. Even so, we must recognize
that continuing customer preference for FMS sales
results from 1) perception of nominally lower prices
and 2) usefulness to customer of U.S. role as program
manager and source of logistics support. On the
other hand, the main attractions of direct sale to
customers is routinely quicker delivery and
availability of equipment not adopted into the Navy
inventory.
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Conclusion : From a business point of view, Navy should work to
encourage direct sales. Concommitantly, FMS can be
marketed more vigorously to achieve higher rate
production with its attendant advantages.
Recommend ations
: CNM determine if implementation of an aggressive
approach to foreign sales is politically saleable.
If so, augment MAT 08F staff and commit to a foreign
sales market's approach for those products that will
have economic payoff for the Navy.




Issue Title : 9. Management by Distrust: Adversary Relationship
Problem Description : Throughout the Navy acquisition community, distrust
of industry seems to be a general attitude of
distrusting industry. This causes conflicts, and
distraction of time and effort to proof of honesty.
Dealing with trivial details to make a point often
absorbs valuable resources that should have been
applied to getting on with the main effort. Often
times one hears a government official state "all
contractors are crooks." This epitomizes an
adversary mind set that is in no way a healthy
attitude for any good business relationship. Nor is
this mind set accurate; we did not find dishonesty as
a cause of cost growth.
Conclusion : Navy and defense industry must have a good business
relationship and therefore adversary attitudes must
be turned around. To be truly effective, other
services should adopt the same position.
Recommendation : CNM issue policy, in conjunction with the JLCs, to
articulate a positive position in this area, and that
marketing of this concept be advocated throughout
NAVMAT. This does not imply relaxing of good
business management or current standards of conduct.
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Backup Material : Shipbuilders Council of America! paper on Adversary
4k Relationship (1974 on 75).
NMARC (Ref. 6)
DSB Summer Studies (Refs. 11, 12)
General Slay's Testimony (Ref. 107)
Defense Industry, J. Gansler (Ref. 214)
Military Industrial Complex, Rep. R. Wilson,
(Ref. 225)
Foolish Adversaries, 0. Boileau, (Ref. 226)




Issue Title : 10. Cost Accounting Standards
Problem Description : At present, industry is exposed to conflicting
regulations for depreciation. One set of
depreciation guidelines is issued by IRS. Firms must
follow these in submitting income tax returns.
Another set was issued by the Cost Accounting
Standards Board (CAS 409). Industry is concerned
that if more rapid depreciation is allowed, as would
be the case if HR 4646 and S 1435 were enacted, then
CAS 409 could be used to "thwart" the intent of such
legislation. Industry argues that CAS be revised to
institute depreciation accounting rules that are
compatible with tax regulations.
Conclusion : This situation is complex and seems to be a problem.
Action needs to be taken to insure compatability.
Recommendation : MAT 08C be tasked to prepare a position for
presentation by the CNM to the JLCs with the
intention of pursuing this problem with 0MB.
Backup Material : General Slay's Testimony, (Ref. 107)
SAO Report (Ref. 119)
Industry Interviews
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Issue Tit1e : 11. Approval /Provisional
Approval for Service Use
(ASU/PASU ).
Problem Description : The ASU/PASU process is costly because
it is time
consuming and tends to interrupt production.
ASU/PASU requirements stipulate that subsystems/
components be approved for service use before
production funds (e.g. OPN, APN) can be expended.
ASU is granted only upon completion of extensive
operational evaluation (OPEVAL) tests to prove
operational suitability.
But testing which supports determination of ASU
must
be performed on hardware that is as nearly
identical
as possible to units that will be produced when
full
rate production is initiated following ASU.
For a variety of reasons, the time required to
obtain
ASU/PASU is excessive; this situation is agravated
further by present administrative, material and
manufacturing lead times.
A substantial production line hiatus (production gap)
can occur while testing is being conducted
and while
waiting for ASU or PASU to be granted.
In order to provide for limited production with
other
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R&D funds, to span development model manufacture and
full rate production, a secretarial waiver is
required. Further, there is a Navy mind set against
this practice.
Conclusion : If continuity of production is maintained between
that required for OT&E and full scale production,
unit costs could be reduced and investment in
facilttazation would be motovated. Therefore the ASU
process should be changed to accomodate, when
prudent, interim production in advance of ASU without
requiring the heroic machinations of a secretarial
waiver.
Recommendation : 1. CNM request CNO delegate authority for ASU to
CNM or SYSCOM Commanders.
2. SYSCOMs assure acquisition strategies provide
for smooth transition and continuity of
production by planning for smooth transition
from ED to low rate production as a Milestone II
decision.
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3. Combine ASU/production into one Milestone III
decision.
Backup Material Government and Industry Interviews
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Issue Title : 12. Utility of Basic Research and Exploratory
Development Programs
Problem Description : About seven hundred million dollars are spent
annually on the Navy's 6.1 and 6.2 programs. The
benefit and utility of these expenditures is not
clear; nor are effective mechanisms in place for
technology transfer.
Conclusion : In order to realize potential benefits of the tech
base in the Navy cost arena:
. More effective means for technology transfer must
be implemented (Most industries interviewed had no
knowledge of Navy tech base efforts)
.
Synergism with IR&D and company funded research
must be pursued.
. Tech base effort should have as a major
orientation, the development of technologies which
ultimately reduce Navy outlays, e.g., increased
energy efficiency, reliability, decreased
maintenance, or least cost manning policies.
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Recommendation : That the CND be requested to establish management
objectives to assure effective technology transfer
mechanisms are in place, that the IR&D program is
effectively leveraged by the Navy tech base, and that
a strong cost savings orientation be applied to the
6.2 program objectives.
Backup Material : Industry and SYSCOM Interviews
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Decision Delays
Issue Title : 15. b. Dual Acquisition Executives
Problem Description : Decision making within the Navy is complicated due to
the existence of shared decision making authority
between ASN (MRA&L) and ASN (RE&S). Many actions
(e.g., exception 11 RAN/D&F, production waivers,
etc.) must pass through both ASN's. This delays
decision making.
Conclusion : The dual acquisition executive structure complicates
the decision-making process.
Acquisition process lead times could be
streamlined/shortened by accelerated decision
making. Decisions can be effected more rapidly by
having fewer persons involved in the process.
The problem at the DOD level was addressed by merging
the I&L and DDR&E organizations that existed
previously into the present Research and Engineering
organization. The action placed responsibility for
DOD system acquisition clearly in the hands of a
single acquisition executive.
OSD policy (DOD Directive 5000.1) states clearly that
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each Department is to designate one Acquisition
Executive who shall be responsible for all
acquisition undertakings within the affected
Department.
Recommendation : CNM lobby with SECNAV to clarify the Acquisition
Executive role at the ASN level, and assign a single
official for secretarial acquisition issues.
Backup Material : 0MB Circluar A-109 (Ref. 1)
DSB 1977 Summer Study (Ref. 4)
DSB 1979 Summer Study (Ref. 12)
NMARC (Ref. 6)
GAO Reports (Ref. 105, 106, 124, 127)
Industry Interviews
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Issue Title : 13. b. Contract Processing Delay
Problem Description : Contracting decision making is laborious and drawn
out. The time delays in contract processing
contribute markedly to cost growth.
The cost of goods and services during the time
procurement actions are being processed increases due
to inflation.
Additional overhead cost are incurred in-house and by
industry as a result of contract processing delays
Checks and balances that have grown up over the years
have weighted the system heavily toward "group"
decision making and multiple review steps to ensure
tht all precautions are taken in connection with
every contract action.
The cost effectiveness of "protecting against all
possible protest" is questionable.
Greater delegation of contracting officer
authority would likely accelerate the procurement
process.
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Conclusion : Positive action to reduce delays is necessary.
Recommendation : Delegate increased contracting officer authority and
responsibility to lower organizational levels
commensurate with ability of individuals selected for
such increased authority/responsibility.
Shift to use of omnibus/class Determinations and
Findings covering broad programs vice individual
procurements.
Grant contracting officer warrants to selected
Program Managers.
Increase numbers of non-supervisory contract
negotiators (this infers higher graded journeyman
negotiations).
Necessary checks and balances could be achieved
through a sampling procedure and a heavy investment
in training of contracting personnel vested with the
increased decision making authority contemplated
herein.
1-101
Backup Material : NAVAIR paper regarding non-supervisory contract
negotiators. (Ref. )
Report of the Commission on Government Procurement.
(Ref. 2)
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 1970 (Ref. 65)
Interviews with government and industry personnel.
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Issue Title: 13.c. Project Management Inhibitors
Problem Description : Many project managers are subjected to multiple
layers of supervision. Multiple layers of
supervision delay decision making and disrupt
attention to program management.
Conclusion: The cost implications of delayed decision making are
increasing and may now outweigh considerations that
have led heretofore to layering of supervision over
many project managers.
Reduction of supervisory layering would likely
stimulate accelerated decision-making which has cost
saving implications.
Recommendation: CNM reguire absolute minimun or no layering between
project/acquisition managers and their Flag Project
Backup Material Report of Commission on Government Procurement
(Ref. 2)
NAVMAT- Industry Roundtable (Ref. (3)
NMARC (Ref. 5)
GAO Reports (Refs. 105, 106, 124, 117)
Military Industrial Complex, Rep. R. Wilson (Ref. 225)
Foolish Adversaries, 0. Boileau (Ref. 225)





Issue Title : 14. Management Reserves
Problem Description : An effective system of management reserves does not
exist. Without reserves, the PM has no flexibility
to manage. This situation then produces delays in
decision making which increase cost with passage of
time. So, when cost growth occurs the PM has no
other alternatives except to incur schedule delay or
descope.
Good programs/program managers are penalized as their
funds are "raided" by budgeteers to bail out other
programs in trouble or to fund new efforts. The
present system is "reverse incenti vised."
Conclusion : The "management reserve" problem has never been dealt
with effectively.
The philosophy of the staff "budgeteers" must be
reconciled with the philosophy of the line program
managers to sustain management reserves in the budget.
The problem can be solved through joint determined
effort. Lacking such determination it should be
determined by fiat by the CNM.
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Recommendation: Established a system of management reserves at the
SYSCOM level where each Project Manager is assigned a
"management reserve" "Draw" account on the
comptroller's books. The amount designated should
not be raided by the comptroller or other project
managers. Changes (loans) between Project Manager's




Commission on Govermnent Procurement (Ref. 2)
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GAO Reports (Ref 112, 126, 127)
HASC Report (Ref. 128)









PERCEIVED REASONS FOR NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIOR RECOMMENDATIONS
The disappointing progress in implementing prior recommendations as
shown in Part A is judged to be attributable to the following summarized
reasons:
1. Much implementation activity has been directed toward
reporting status of the tracking activity—and in trying to
show the recommendations as "being closed out" or as having
been implemented vice being directed at the hard core
recommendations themselves.
2. Many prior implementation actions have been segmented to
address individual specific recommendations when a broad
orchestrated set of implementation actions is really
necessary to get at underlying problems.
3. Many past implementing actions have been aimed at symptoms
instead of fundamental underlying causes. (Frequent band
aid approach.)
4. Many prior study recommendations do not come to grips with
the fundamental incentives that operate to cause people to
do what they do. (These are cases where past recommendations
are implemented only half heartedly or not at all because
they are really reverse incentives. Others are not
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implemented because they are directed at inappropriate
levels of management (where the level that is the subject
of the recommendation can't practically implement the
recommendation because it is beyond the scope of that
level ' s authority).
5. We believe that the most common reason for nonimplemen-
tation is simply that relentless action on the part of
management is not taken to ensure that sensible recommen-
dations are indeed implemented. It is relatively common
for one level of management simply to direct a lower level
to implement a set of recommendations then essentially
walk away and trust to luck. (Thre is seldom any real
hard core follow up of a nature where one goes to see what
the true status really is.) The IG and Navy Area Audit
reviews don't really get at the problem either because
these are compliance-type reviews done by people who likely
are far from being experts in what they are doing. By
analogy, they are competent most times to look and see if
people are speeding or breaking some traffic law, but they
lack expertise to tell whether the stop signs are in the
right place or if the speed limits are set right.
Practical examples of the preceding can be cited: For example, many
studies advance detailed and repeated recommendations relating to budget
over optimism and program turbulence. Most people at the SYSCOM and even
NAVMAT level view these problems as beyond their scope or ability to solve.
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Similarly, in many instances it is apparent that people just go right on
doing as they have always done because it is easier that way than to change.
Where large numbers of people are involved in a complex process not much
progress can be noted when only one or two people change. It is necessary
for large numbers of people to change and that only comes as a result of
someone higher up pushing relentlessly to see that sensible recommendations
are indeed implemented. It is usually too much to hope that they will take
root and grow of their own accord.
Conclusion:
Instituting fundamental changes is very difficult. The top decision
maker must first have clear ideas about what must be done. He must be able
to articulate these to his organizations, and he must create an apparatus
to implement and monitor these changes. Furthermore, he must devote a
large amount of his own time to making sure that the changes are implemented;
and he must pursue and support these goals relentlessly. Above all, he
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Recommendations That Are Procedural In Nature
1. Recommendation #1 (Test Case Procedure)
Establish immediately a "test case" where one project office in NAVSEA and
one in NAVAIR is designated as such. With respect to each test case
project office so selected:
a. Pick a qualified contracting officer and designate him Deputy
Project Manager, (Consider designating the Project Business/Financial
Manager as Contracting Officer when such individual has had prior
Contracting Officer experience). Require such person to reside physically
in the Project Office and report to the Project Manager. Empower the
Contracting Officer with Contracting Officer authority commensurate with
the dollar value of effort being pursued by the Project Office. Groom such
individual as a prospective future Project Manager.
b. Detail one or more non-supervisory contract negotiators to the
Project Management staff. Require such personnel to reside physically in
the P.M. office.
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c. As an alternative to (a) and at some future time consider
designating selected Project Managers as Contracting Officers.
d. Delegate significantly increased contracting officer authority to
the SUPSHIP/NAVPRO, etc., applicable to the aforementioned "test case"
project offices. Require maximum delegation of authority/responsibility
from the PM to the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACQ) to adjudicate
changes to applicable contracts.
e. Designate one member of the OGC staff as counsel to each "test
case" project office. Require such designated OGC personnel to be located
physically in the PM office. Empower such OGC personnel to approve for OGC
any and aJM actions that would normally be screened by OGC under existing
procedures.
Rationale
• Authority and responsibility are currently diffused. Multiple
participants—no matter how expert they are individually in their own
field—generally cause actions to take longer than they would were fewer
participants involved. This recommendation is predicated on the
considerable body of opinion and fact being accumulated in private industry
(and government) that demonstrates that "a few highly qualified people"
working intimately together are more efficient than a larger group of
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similarly qualified persons working as a committee. There is substantial
evidence also to indicate that the quality of decisions made by smaller
groups equals or exceeds the quality of decisions made by larger groups.
• Private industry, and many in-house Navy observers/participants
in the acquisition process seriously recommend designating the Project
Manager as Contracting Officer. The rationale is basically to recognize,
that most Project Managers are de facto Contracting Officers—therefore why
not simply empower them legally to do at the outset those things which they
now accomplish via Proxy through the Contracting Officer.
t The System Commanders are Contracting Officers by virtue of
being "Heads of Processing Activities" notwithstanding their specific
Contracting Officer background or lack thereof. It may be argued therefore
that certain Project Managers who possess adequate backgrounds could
exercise the added responsibility and authority of the Contracting Officer
without jeopardy.
• Some people argue that Project Managers would be more cautious
rather than less cautious were they empowered with the Contracting
Officer's responsibility and authority. (Meaning the effect would be good
as it would make the Program Manager be more conscious of the business
aspects of his decision making.)
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t The usual argument against designating the Project Manager as
Contracting Officer is that such action would place too much power in the
hands of one individual and jeopardize needed checks and balances.
o Any move toward designating Project Managers as Contracting
Officers is perceived by the contracting community as an encroachment upon
their domain.
• It is the thesis of this report that the pendulum has swung too
far toward overspecialization and compartmentalization of work effort. We
have reached the point where one has to have an expert or a "focal point"
for every segment of a large task. This breeds fractionization of effort,
produces friction between segments, tends to induce a serial approach to
effort, which collectively adds to the time required to execute a given
effort— thereby inflating the cost commensurate with the added time
required to accomplish a given effort.
• To overcome the strenuous objections of the contracting
community to any move to designate Project Managers as Contracting Officers
the approach of picking a qualified Contracting Officer and designating him
as Deputy Project Manager is recommended.
r Adoption of this procedure would likely have the following
effect:
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a. It would provide daily contracting/business management
expertise within the Project Office.
b. It would provide an overdue expanded avenue of career
progression for the contracting community.
c. It would bring the Project Management and Contracting
Communities closer together.
d. It would likely stimulate improved and shortened decision
making (providing the person so designated as Deputy Project
Manager/Contracting Officer is empowered with substantial dollar value)
Contracting Officer authority. (Should be high enough to cover all
transactions contemplated to occur within the Project Office involved.)
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2. Recommendation $2 (Management Reserves)
Establish realistic management reserves pertinent to each "test case"
project. Fence such funds so that they are not subject to being "swept up"
by the SYSCOM Comptroller. Empower the PM to reapply to his project at his
discretion, any funds that he generates from cost avoidance, cost savings,
etc. Exercise the full weight of CNM authority/influence to preclude
higher authority from holding hostage any funds that have been appropriated
pertinent to the "test case" project office efforts.
Rationale
t The current project financial management system embodies
several dis-incentives:
a. It forces a cops and robbers game between Project
Managers and SYSCOM Comptrollers.
b. It stimulates spending rates often tied to the calendar
vice program events.
c. It tends to penalize proficient Program Managers/programs
and rewards poor Project Managers/programs. (As programs get in trouble,
higher levels of management tend generally to "take from the healthy and
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give to the sick." All too frequently the result is to end up with two
sick projects. Better the sick project be killed perhaps and the funds
thus made available given to the healthy projects to make them more
healthy.
• The overriding objective should be to provide the tools to the
Project Manager that he needs to perform effectively. We handicap him on
purpose when we raid his funds—which were undoubtedly underprogrammed to
begin with.
• The negative incentives should be turned around and made into
positive incentives. A proficient Project Manager should be rewarded
through being able to reapply any savings generated by his actions to his
own program. He should not have to be continually looking over his
shoulder to ward off those who would raid his funds at the slightest
opportunity.
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3. Recommendation #3 (Management Reserve Pool)
Establish within each SYSCOM a project management reserve "pool"
operated by the Comptroller whereby each PM has an amount "on the books"
from which he can draw up to his allocated amount. Permit PMs to negotiate
trades between each other so long as the Comptroller maintains the books
and knows the status of each PMs management reserve. CNM ensures that such
reserves are not "raided" for other purposes.
Rationale
• To permit each Project Manager to maintain a management reserve
of needed proportions would require funding levels that are not
realistically attainable. Since management reserves are not needed all at
the same time and amount by all Project Managers it is feasible to create a
"pooling" concept where each Project Office in essence has a "line of
credit" with the SYSCOM Comptroller. The Comptroller need maintain on hand
only those amounts that he determines are needed to satisfy some
statistically significant number of "draws" by Project Managers against their
authorized "lines of credit."
•
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9 If the "reserve pool "/line of credit concept is operated and
policed properly one can anticipate a large amount of "horse trading"
between Project Managers. This should be allowed! Such approach would
create a healthy climate of cooperation between Project Managers and
concurrently would relieve the Comptroller of feeling obliged to "police"
the Project Managers.
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4. Recommendation #4 (Non-interference)
To the extent possible prohibit interference in project office conduct





• We must take firm steps to insulate the PMs from
extraneous/outside interference. At the very least we should declare a
moratorium on self-imposed interference on the Project Management staffs.
To limit outside interference we should negotiate a moratorium with the GAO
that provides at least for GAO to obtain CNM approval in advance prior to
descending upon a SYSCOM project office.
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5. Recommendation #5 (Stepladder Quantities and Optimum Rates)
Strongly encourage the "test case" PMs to solicit proposals based on
"stepladder" quantities and optimum rate of effort (as seen by the
contending contractors).
Rationale
• The pendulum has perhaps swung too far in our zeal to treat all
contractors equally. Contractors, just like people, are different. They
have different resources that can or cannot be brought to bear at different
times.
• We should capitalize upon such differences when feasible rather
than force the common denominator approach.
• Sufficient latitude exists under current contracting ground
rules to permit greater use of the stepladder and optimum rate of effort
approach.
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6. Recommendation #6 (Source Selection)
Empower the "test case" PM to be the source selection authority.
Encourage the PM to solicit technical proposals and eliminate X-number
based on technical evaluation alone. Negotiate with remaining contenders,
Make award based predominately on past (cost credibility) track record
coupled with proven technical competence.
Rationale
§ The pendulum has perhaps swung too far toward segmenting the
source selection process in the effort to maintain a "scrupulously fair"
process. The in-house overhead cost is substantial. Many observers
contend that the exercise is pro forma and done primarily for cosmetic
reasons with the final outcome being a political decision that most
knowledgeable observers could predict ahead of time.
• The actions recommended would shorten the time required
normally to progress from RFP issuance to contract award.
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t It is judged that sufficient checks and balances would continue
to exist under the recommended procedure to protect the integrity of the
source selection process.
t The recommendation to lean towards selecting the best technical
proposals and then subsequently soliciting cost proposals from only the
remaining contenders is designed to accomplish several improvements in the
evaluation/selection process:
First : It eliminates substantial bid and proposal cost on
the part of all contenders during the first round if they are involved only
in preparing a technical proposal.
Second : It focuses the first round on the technical aspects
of the program.
Third : It simplifies, and should therefore shorten the
evaluation process. (Fewer cost proposals are evaluated.)
Fourth : It eliminates some of the "auction" aspects that
industry alleges continually creep into the source selection process.
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• The recommendation to base award more strongly on past cost
credibility track record coupled with proven technical competence is
advanced because it is industry's strong perception that the Navy does not
follow this procedure. Knowledgeable Navy personnel dispute the industry
contention. There is insufficient data readily available to document the
case one way or another. Both sides agree that this approach is preferable
therefore it should be pursued strongly and progress should be tracked
precisely to determine the real extent of compliance with this policy.
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7. Recommend at ion #7 (Determinations and Findings)
Draft class determinations and findings (CD&Fs) pertinent to the
procurements involved in the "test case" projects. Obtain Secretarial
approval of these CD&Fs such that no subsequent approvals of procurement
transactions pertinent to the "test case" projects are necessary.
Rationale : Statutes currently require a Secretarial approval before
procurements of certain type and magnitude can be awarded. The statutory
requirement is to preclude abuses to the procurement process. The main
thrust of the requirement was meant to ensure also that procurements are
openly advertised for formal advertized bidding whenever possible. When
"negotiation" is more appropriate then certain thresholds apply. In the
weapons development arena, these requirements translate generally to the
Secretariat becoming involved in procurement transactions where the value
is $100,000 or greater.
The number of such transactions requiring Secretarial involvement and
approval of the "Determination and Finding" document related to such
procurements is extensive.
The basic statutes provide also for combining a series of individual
contemplated procurement transactions under an "umbrella" or "CLASS"
determination and finding. Obviously, expanded use of the "class D&F"
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approach where warranted would reduce the number of individual procurement
transaction requiring Secretarial involvement. The reduction in number
could streamlinde the review/approval process.
It is recommended that greater use of class D&Fs be initiated by the
System Commanders and endorsed strongly by the Chief of Naval Material. It
is recommended that the CNM lobby strongly with key Secretariat personnel
to push for Secretariat acceptance of the broad end use of class D&Fs.
In the past, the tendency has been for the Secretariat to utilize the
D&F document as a program control document that was used at times to
restructure programs. It is judged that if the Secretariat is persuaded to
accept broadened use of the class D&F approach there will have to be some
greater assurances given the Secretariat by the CNM that proper control is
being exercised over the process at the CNM level. Proper levels of
assurance can be secured through tighter management of the Acquisition
strategy document at the CNM level. It is recommended that as a quid pro
quo for expanded use of the class D&F approach, the CNM assure the
Secretariat that acquisition strategy documents pertinent to such programs
will be approved personally at the CNM level.
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3. Recommendation #8 (Turbulence)
Advise the CMO and the Secretariat of the "test case" procedure and
seek OPNAV/Secretariat cooperation in prohibiting program/funding
turbulence involving the "test case" programs.
Rationale : If the Navy is serious about constraining weapons
acquisition program cost growth, the Navy should be willing to implement a
moratorium against self-inflicted program/funding turbulence in the test
case programs.
Virtually all persons interviewed (both govt and industry) asserted
forcefully that program (quantity changes both up and down) and funding
turbulence was the principal factor causing cost growth in established
acquisition programs.
The problem has been recognized and acknowledged for years yet little
or no progress has been made toward solving the problem. Where turbulence
is imposed from OSD levels or higher there is limited opportunity to
constrain such turbulence. Sufficient opportunities do exist however to
constrain turbulence that is self-induced within the Navy hierarchy.
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It is recommended strongly that a moratorium simply be declared and
maintained by the CNM against program/funding turbulence pertinent to the
selected "test case" programs. This is within the authority of the CNM to
execute unilaterally and by straightforward mandate.
Concurrently, the Secretariat and OPNAV should be informed of the CNM
imposed moratorium and their cooperation solicited in attempting to hold










Recommendations That Are Organizational and Procedural in Nature
1. Recommendation #1 : Business Management Cadre
Develop and train a cadre of SES level business managment experts,
charged to HQNAVMAT ceiling; then assign one of these to each SYSCOM
commander who would:
a Expedite strategies through system and take approval
action previously taken by CNM staff
t Act as an acquisition and business advisor to the
SYSCOM Commander, and institute business management
training programs within the SYSCOM.
• Become a repository of NAVMAT-wide corporate knowledge
• Rotate every two years among SYSCOMS/major PMs/Navy
Secretariat/DSMC
Rationale :
There are a number of objectives to be attained by this
recommendation:
a. Delegation is being effected
HJQ
b. Reducing NAVMAT HQTRs staff and detailed involve-
ment
c. Creating the required mind-set on good business
management, and developing business management ex-
pertise at the execution level
d. Developing a mechanism for collecting corporate
knowledge and transferring it to acquisition (program)
managers.
2. Recommendation 2:
Layout a management tracking system that will track the progress









Recommendations That Are Attitudinal and Procedural in Nature
1. Recommendation #1 Delegation of Authority/Responsibility
CNM and SYSCOM Commanders direct a campaign of delegating authority and
responsibility to the lowest levels possible commensurate with the ability
of specific persons involved to accommodate such increased authority and
responsibility.
Rationale : The rationale for such recommendation goes without saying.
It is a widely recognized good business practice. We pay frequent lip
service to the practice but it is not carried out nearly to the extent that
it could or should be.
The practical implementation of this recommendation can occur two
ways
:
First : As a by-product of implementing the "floor manager"
approach discussed in Section II Part B preceding.
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Second : Through a concerted effort to specifically delegate
increased authority and responsibility to specific individuals.
Note : Where such action increases the authority and responsibility of
person "A" at the expense of person "8" then we must be prepared also to
accept the fact that person B may not be needed in the loop as before and
we should be willing to shift that person/billet to a place where he/she/it
may be needed more acutely.
Concluding Note : The collateral end result of such a campaign should
be to free up some billets/personnel assets at higher managerial levels
that can be shifted into the severely undermanned project management
offices. (We should be able to experience a-subtle shift of some key
personnel from "overhead" into "direct labor."
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2.' Recommendation #2 "UNO DIR Approach"
Adopt throughout the acquisition community the practice of advising
one's superior that one is proceeding as indicated unless otherwise
directed. (UNODIR approach).
Rationale : If we accept the assertion that we have competent people
running key projects, and if we delegate increased authority and
responsibility to them as recommended herein—then we should be willing as
well to manage increasingly "by exception."
The practical way to do that and to streamline the review/approval
process is to permit our people who are competent to take action on their
own and simply advise their superior(s) that they are doing so, and that
they will procedd as indicated unless pulled up short and told to do
otherwise.
This has the effect of accelerating significantly the decision
process. It does not usurp the authority nor responsibility of higher
eschelon managers—it merely forces them to indeed manage by exception
rather than by detail.
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The fear is that someone will go too far out on a limb and we will be
damaged by some precipitous action taken by an underling. We must balance
that fear against the stretch out in time that is occurring due to each
managerial level having to buck the decision upstairs for resolution. That
approach protects more people. It also elevates an inordinate amount of
decision making to levels above which the decision could really be made
logically.
The argument that only the higher level decision makers have the broad
perspective and all the facts needed to make a given decision must be
weighed against the stretch out in decision making time that occurs
inevitably under such an approach. It is also far from certain that the
higher levels are better armed with facts. More often than not, the
greater the distance such decision making is removed from the problem the
more watered down the real facts become.
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3. Recommendation #3 (Preplanned Product Improvement)
fj|| Adopt a philosphy relative to weapons develpment/acquisition risk that
differs unacceptable risk to a preplanned subsequent upgrade. (Accept less
perfection in earlier time frames; but plan for and carry out feasible
upgrades in subsequent time frames.)
Rationale : In any major undertaking the basic dilemma is to judge and
decide how large the steps of progress should be toward the objective of
the effort. No set formula or approach is appropriate as each situation
varies substantially from others.
There are strong pros and cons that can be agreed on this issue and it
is beyond the scope of this report to lay out both sides of that agreement
in detail
.
On balance, and for purposes of this study, we have taken the position
that it is better to err on the side of smaller, more discrete, preplanned,
incremental, steps than the larger, more all encompassing approach.
We are persuaded that there are habitually enough unknowns and pitfalls
in the course of developing/acquiring any weapon system that one is likely
to be ahead of the game in the long run by planning future improvements at
the outset as one goes rather than trying to incorporate all that is









a. Faulty business strategy
b. Multi-year advantages not exploited
c. 0MB Circular A109
d. Inadequate specifications
e. Risk assessment/rewards
2. FAULTY INITIAL BUDGETING
a. Government inability to handle higher-than-budgeted inflation
(inflation rates stipulated by 0MB)
b. Self-fulfilling prophecy syndrome
c. Proposal evaluation/source selection driven by price competition
d. Too many programs/ resources spread too thin
e. Design to cost/affordability
3. PROGRAM TURBULENCE
a. Funding/ perturbations
b. Peaks and valleys in contract workload
c. Uneconomical production rates
4. CAPITAL INVESTMENT/INDUSTRY BASE MOBILIZATION
a. Cost of money
b. On again/off again programs
c. Productivity enhancement
d. Inventory versus mobilization capability
5. GFE/CFE TRADE OFFS
a. Contractor warranties
b. Storage/obsolescence costs
c. System/subsystems design drivers and total system integration
d. GFE and standardization
e. Data procurement
6. CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, PROPOSAL EVALUATION, AND SOURCE SELECTION
a. Previous cost experience is not usually used by negotiating team
b. Government negotiating teams not as well prepared as industry in
area of cost and pricing analysis
c. Undue focus on profit when labor and material are far more important
cost drivers
d. Profit and G&A pyramiding in subcontract area
e. Improper use of DCAA/DCAS evaluations
f. Accelerate proposal evaluation time
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7. CONTRACT CHANGES/CONTRACT ADMINISTRATIONS
a. Timely adjudication of changes
b. Constructive changes (volume of incidence and level of organiza-
tion)
c. Delay, disruption, and ripple effect (especially in shipbuilding)
d. Cost growth as a function of unknown unknowns (UNK/UNKS)
e. Value engineering
f. Navy overhead cost of contract administration (audits, preaward
surveys, etc.)
8. NATO/FMS
a. Foreign armaments collaboration
b. Business implication of military sales to foreign customers
9. MANAGEMENT BY DISTRUST: ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP
10. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
11. APPROVAL/PROVISIONAL APPROVAL FOR SERVICE USE (ASU/PASU)
12. UTILITY OF BASIC RESEARCH AND EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
13. DECISION DELAYS
a. Dual acquisition executives
b. Contract processing delay






NAVY ACQUISITION COST STUDY -
LITERATURE SEARCH AND ANALYSIS
The literature search and selected bibliography listed in this section
are the results of fifteen bibliographic searches which produced some
two-hundred items for review. Searches were limited to the topic of
defense acquisition cost growth, from 1970 to the present time. Pertinent
documents were drawn from:
Defense Documentation Center,
Defense Technical Information Center,
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange,
Defense Systems Management College Information Center,
Army Procurement Research Office, and the
personal collections of study contributors.
Only those documents which indicated a substantive relationship to cost
growth are listed in the selected bibliography. Note that all item numbers
through 250 have not been assigned. Entries were cataloged in block groups
of fifty as the collection was assembled, for the convenience of the study
members.
3-1
Except for material belonging personally to study group participants,
documents assembled during this effort will form the basis for a collection
in defense acquisition cost growth at the Defense Systems Management
College.
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NAVY ACQUISITION COST STUDY
Selected Bibliography
Item Nos. Documents
1 . 50 FORMAL COMMISSIONS /PANELS
51 - 99 REPORTS/STUDIES
100 - 150 CONGRESS/GAO, HEARINGS, REPORTS
151 - 199 THESES/PAPERS




1. MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITIONS , A discussion of the Application of OMB
Circular No. A-109, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management
and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, OFPP Pamphlet No. 1,
August 1976.
2. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, VOLUME 2 ,
December 1972, Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C.
3. PROCEEDINGS, NAVMAT- INDUSTRY, SENIOR EXECUTIVE ROUNDTABLE ,
December 1979, at the United States Naval Academy, hosted by American
Defense Preparedness Association.
4. REPORT OF THE ACQUISITION CYCLE TASK FORCE , Defense Science Board 1977
Summer Study, 15 March 1978, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, Washington, D.C.
5. DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STUDY , Final Report by Donald B. Rice,
February 1979, A Report Requested by the President and submitted to the




5. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION REVIEW COMMITTEE ,
Action/Status.
7. REPORT OF THE NAVY MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION REVIEW COMMITTEE (VOLS I &
II) , Office of the Secretary of the Navy, January 1975
8. ACHIEVING IMPROVED NATO EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH ARMAMENTS COLLABORATION ,
Defense Science Board 1978 Summer Study, December 1978
9. REPORT ON COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT , Defense Science Board
Task Force, July 1978
10. NATO FAMILY OF WEAPONS , Report of the Defense Science Board Study
Group, January 1979
11. INDUSTRIAL RESPONSIVENESS , Defense Science Board 1980 Summer Study,
Jan 1981
12. REDUCING THE UNIT COST OF EQUIPMENT , Defense Science Board 1979 Summer
Study, March 1980
13. SUMMARY BRIEFING , Defense Science Board 1980 Summer Study, Task Force




51. Building Naval Vessels: A Handbook of Shipyard Costs , March 1980,
Report No. 80-1, Edward M. Kaitz and Associates.
52. System Acquisition Strategies , Report No. R-733-PR/ARPA, June 1971,
R. Perry, G. Smith, A. Harman and S. Henri cksen, Rand Corporation.
53. Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) Price Index Study , Report Number
CNS-1091, June 1977, W. Morgan, Center For Naval Analyses.
54. Hardware Cost Growth , Report Number 010.307, September 1970, M.
Patterson, Research Analysis Corporation.
55. A Study of Ship Acquisition Cost Estimating In The Naval Sea Systems
Command , Report No. AD-A046-976, October 1977, International Maritime
Associates.
56. Survey and Annotated Bibliography On Literature Pertaining to Internal
Financing Incentives In System Acquisition , Report No. 78-01-02,
R. Blanning, P. Kleindorfer, and 0. Fohar, February 1978, University of
Pennsylvania, The Wharton School.
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57. A Dynamic Theory of Contractual Incentives , R. Blanning and P.
Kleindorfer, Report No. 78-01-03, February 1978, University of
Pennsylvania, The Wharton School.
58. The Change Process In Systems Acquisition , Report No. KTR-703-2,
W. Douglas, August 1973, Ketron, Inc.
59. Development of Cost Escalation Indices for Operations and Maintenance
Budget Categories , Report AD/A061817, P. Earl and C. Elwell, June 1978,
Data Resources, Inc.
60. Naval Ship Procurement Process Study , Final Report, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Manpower, Reserve Officers and Logistics, Department
of the Navy, July 1978
61. The Ship Acquisition Policy Advisory Council Review of proposed NAVSEA
actions on Naval Ship Procurement Process Study Conclusions (1979)
62. Ship Acquisition Organization: An Evolutionary Process ,
Cdr. R. Hatch, Defense Systems Management School Study Report, November 1972
63. Review of Past Studies , prepared for NAVSEA 00X Command Study, NAVSEA,
15 February 1977
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64. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel , Report to the President and the
Secretary of Defense, 1 July 1970
65. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel , (Appendix E), July 1970
66. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel , (Appendix L), July 1970
67. Naval Material Command Organization Study, Phase IV , Report of the
Study Panel to the Chief of Naval Material, November 1977
68. Naval Sea Systems Command Study Report , 30 December 1977
69. The Aircraft Acquisition and Support (AIRACS) Study , Final Report,
3 April 1967
70. POD Weapons Systems Software Acquisition and Management Study,
Volume I , MTR-6908, the MITRE Corporation, 1975
71. Cost Control In Air Force Systems Acquisition , P. Cor ley and
A. Roscoe, Report No. 5560, AIR War College, April 1975
72
.
Improving Management of Acquisition In the Naval Material Command ,
Final Report of the Phase III Panel, December 1976
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73. An Analysis of Weapon System Intervals, Past and Present , G. Smith &
E. Friedman, Report No. R-2605-DR&E/AF, Rand Corporation, November 1980
74. Acquisition Policy Effectiveness: POD Experience in the 1970' s,
E. Dews & G. Smith, Report No. R-2516-DR&E, Rand Corporation, December 1980
75. Case Study: FFG-7 Class Ship , F. Easton, Naval Postgraduate School,
August 1978.
76. The Profitability of the U.S. Shipbuilding Industry 1947-1976 ,
E. Kaitz, Report No. 78-1, Laid! aw Management Services, June 1978.
77. Forms of Ownership and A Cost -Effective Shipbuilding Industry ,
E. Kaitz, Report No. 74-1, E. M. Kaitz and Associates, Inc., May 1978.
78. Report on Man-Machine Technology In The Navy , Draft Report




101. INACCURACY OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WEAPONS ACQUISITION COST
ESTIMATES , Ninth Report by the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
November 15, 1979, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
102. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATEMENT ON MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM: COST
ESTIMATION AND CONTROL , by the Honorable Charles W. Duncan, Jr., Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National
Security of the Committee on Government Operations of the House of
Representatives, 25 June, 1979.
103. RECENT CHANGES IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S PROFIT POLICY- INTENDED
RESULTS NOT ACHIEVED , Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General,
GAO, March 8, 1979.
104. FINANCIAL STATUS OF MAJOR ACQUISITIONS, JUNE 30, 1976 , Report to the
Congress by the Comptroller General, GAO, January 18, 1977.
105. A CRITIQUE OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION
REVIEW COUNCIL; BILLIONS IN PUBLIC FUNDS INVOLVED , Report to the Congress
by the Comptroller General, GAO, January 30, 1978.
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106. AN ORGANIZED APPROACH TO IMPROVING FEDERAL PROCUREMENT AND
ACQUISITION PRACTICES , Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General,
GAO, September 30, 1977.
107. THE AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND STATEMENT IN DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
ISSUES , by General Alton D. Slay, Commander, Air Force Systems Command,
before the Industrial Preparedness Panel of the House Armed Services
Committee of the House of Representatives, November 13, 1980.
108. DIGESTS OF MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM REPORTS ISSUED JANUARY AND FEBRUARY
1979 , Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General, GAO, April 25,
1979.
109. NAVY DEPARTMENT PROCUREMENT OF AN/PRC-41 RADIO SETS (SOLE
SOURCE-COLLINS RADIO CO. ), Hearings and Report before the Subcommittee for
special investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, 28 June 1962
110. PYRAMIDING OF PROFITS AND COSTS IN THE MISSILE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM ,
Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Government Operations, 4 April 1962 (Part I, NIKE Program;
Part 2, NIKE Program; Part 3, Atlas Program)
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111. IMPLICATIONS OF HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON MILITARY
CAPABILITIES , PSAD 30-61, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller
General, GAO, June 30, 1980.
112. EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. FORCES CAN BE INCREASED THROUGH IMPROVED WEAPON
SYSTEM DESIGN , PSAD 81-17, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller
General, GAO, January 29, 1981.
113. A NEW APPROACH IS NEEDED FOR WEAPON SYSTEM COPRODUCTION PROGRAMS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES , Report to the Congress by the
Comptroller General, GAO, April 12, 1979.
114. IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN COST-EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES FOR MAJOR WEAPON
SYSTEMS , PSAD 75-54, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General,
GAO, February 12, 1975.
115. LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATING— ITS STATUS AND POTENTIAL USE IN MAJOR
WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITIONS , PSAD 75-23, Report to the Congress by the
Comptroller General, GAO, December 30, 1974.
116. IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN MAKING AND IN REPORTING ON TECHNICAL
EVALUATIONS OF NONCOMPETITIVE PRICE PROPOSALS , PSAD 75-80, Report to the
Congress by the Comptroller General, GAO, May 8, 1975.
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117. APPLICATIONS OF DESIGN-TO-COST CONCEPT TO MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM
@ ACQUISITIONS , PSAD 75-91, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller
General, GAO, June 23, 1975.
118. OPPORTUNITIES FOR DECREASING PROCUREMENT COSTS THROUGH INCREASED USE
OF COMPETITION AND FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICE , PSAD 76-29, Report to the
Congress by the Comptroller General, GAO, October 16, 1975.
119. STATUS REPORT ON THE COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS PROGRAM
-
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROBLEMS , PSAD 76-154, Report to the Congress by the
Comptroller General, GAO, August 20, 1976.
120. A RANGE OF COST MEASURING RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN MAJOR PROGRAMS—AN
AID TO DECISIONMAKING , PSAD 78-2, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller
General, GAO, February 2, 1978.
121. NEED FOR MORE ACCURATE WEAPON SYSTEM TEST RESULTS TO 8E REPORTED TO
THE CONGRESS , PSAD 79-46, Report to the Congress by the' Comptroller
General, GAO, March 9, 1979.
122. TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING WEAPON SYSTEMS FOR NATO—
A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE , PSAD 79-26, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller
General, GAO, March 21, 1979.
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123. THE MULTINATIONAL F-16 AIRCRAFT PROGRAM: ITS PROGRESS AND CONCERNS
,
PSAD 79-63, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General, GAO,
June 25, 1979.
124. OBSERVATIONS ON OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CIRCULAR A-109--MAJ0R
SYSTEM ACQUISITIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE , PSAD 79-9 Report to the
Congress by the Comptroller General, GAO, February 20, 1979.
125. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT: A FINAL
ASSESSMENT , PSAD 79-80, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General,
GAO, May 31, 1979.
126. IMPLEMENTATION OF MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS—A-109— IS
INCONSISTENT AMONG CIVIL AGENCIES , PSAD 79-89, Report to the Congress by
the Comptroller General, GAO, August 14, 1979.
127. IMPEDIMENTS TO REDUCING THE COSTS OF WEAPON SYSTEMS, PSAD 80-6,
Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General, GAO, November 8, 1979.
128. CAPABILITY OF U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE , Hearing before the




151. Financial Management In the Strategic Systems Project Office , Report
No. PME-75-2, November 1975, W. Clautice, Defense Systems Management
College.
152. An Evaluation of the Navy's Selected Acquisition Reporting System ,
L. McClung, June 1975, Naval Postgraduate School.
153. The Relationship Between Inflation and Defense Expenditures , Report
No. IDA-P-1457, H. Stekler, December 1979, Institute For Defense Analysis.
154. The Impact of Independent Cost Analyses on POD Acquisition
Management , Report No. PMC-77-1, J. Wrobel, May 1977, Defense Systems
Management College.
155. The Procurement Process and Program Cost Outcomes: A Systems
Approach , Report No. AD-734440, R. Sapp, Air Force Institute of Technology.
156. Economic Escalation and The Military Program Manager , Report
PMC-75-2, W. Buckelew, November 1975, Defense Systems Management College.
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157. Depreciation And The Armed Service Procurement Regulations; How They
Affect Cash Flow In The Defense Industry , Report 1985-78, S. Paek, April
1978, Air Command and Staff College.
158. A Statistical Analysis of the Effectiveness of . Program Initial
Conditions As Predictors of Weapon System Acquisition Program Success ,
Master's Thesis, December 1976, D. Henry, Naval Postgraduate School.
159. The Study of Cost Growth of a Major Weapon System , Master's Thesis,
December 1974, D. Webb, Naval Postgraduate School.
160. A Cost Growth Model For Weapon System Development Programs , W. Glover
and J. Levy, Master's Thesis, August 1974, Air Force Institute of
Technology.
161. Potential Adverse Effects of Competitive Prototype Evaluation ; Report
PMC-74-2, J. Evans, November 1974, Defense Systems Management College.
162. Control of Major Changes to and Resultant Cost Growth In Weapon
Systems Acquisition Contracts , Ph.D. Dissertation, A. Meiners, Ph.D.
Dissertation, February 1974, George Washington University.
163. The Naval Ship Acquisition Process as a System , Working Paper 78-1,
S. Dean, C. Jones, M. Sovereign, February 1978, Naval Postgraduate School.
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164. USAF RDT&E Cost Growth - A Perspective , R. Ellsworth, Report 630-79,
Air Command and Staff College, April 1979
165. A General Technique for R&D Cost Forcastinq, W. Weida ,
USAFA-TR-77-12, USAF Academy, September 1977
166. Government Procurement Policy: A Survey of Strategies and Techniques ,
B. Lenk, Report No. T-354, George Washington University, May 1977
167. Interaction of Cost Policy and Estimating: Is Cost Growth Being
Reinforced? , N. Bryan and R. Clark, December 1980
168. Escalation Clauses In Shipbuilding Contracts , J. Veil is, Naval
Postgraduate School, June 1978
169. The Tradeoff Between Learning and Inflation In Shipbuilding ,
F. Frisch and A. Todd, Naval Sea Systems Command, March 1978
170. Compensation for Use of Capital Assets During Periods of Rapid
Inflation: An Evaluation of Department of Defense Procedures Versus
Current Commercial Practice , J. Fairchild, Report No, AFBMRC-V-2-2-74,
Air Force Business Management Research Center, August 1975
171. DoD Systems Acquisition Management: Congressional Criticism and







200. COMMODITY TYPE AS A FACTOR IN CONTRACT COST GROWTH , Brian N. Murtagh,
Technical Report, Florida Institute of Technology, June 1974.
201. CHOICE AMONG STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEM ACQUISITION , Alvin J. Herman,
Technical Report, Rand Corporation, March 1972.
202. PROCEEDINGS, NINTH ANNUAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COST ANALYSIS
SYMPOSIUM, 22-25 September 1974 .
203. HISTORICAL INFLATION PROGRAM , Ralph W. Zilge, USAAVSCOM Technical
Report 76-1, January 1976.
204. PLANNING FOR NAVY SHIP ACQUISITION , J. Augusta, Briefing,
12 January 1981.
205. COST GROWTH-EFFECTS OF CONTRACT SIZE. DURATION, INFLATION, AND
TECHNOLOGY LEVEL , R. L. Launer, H. F. Candy, S. L. Carter, Technical
Report, Procurement Research Office, USALMC, Fort Lee, Virginia, MAY 1972.
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206. EFFECTS OF SHARE RATIO AND RANGE OF INCENTIVE EFFECTIVENESS ,
R. L. Launer, Technical Report, Procurement Research Office, USALMC, Fort
Lee, Virginia, July 1974.
207. EIGHTH ANNUAL DOD/FAI ACQUISITION RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM , May 4-6, 1979,
Co-Sponsored by the Defense Systems Management College and the Federal
Acquisition Institute.
208. POD COMPLIANCE WITH 0MB ACQUISITION CIRCULAR IS TOPIC OF -SPEECH ,
Magazine Article, Army RD&A Magazine, May-June 1978.
209. Briefing Package for NAVMAT Task Group (briefings, memoranda,
studies, etc.), FMS Northern Ordnance Division, 21 January 1981
210. Procurement at AFSC , Procurement/Production Seminar, 1976
211. The Health and Welfare of Navy Systems Management , Briefing,
J. Bennett, 1977
212. Management Issues In the POD , Briefing
213. Arming America , J. Ronald Fox, Harvard University Press, 1974
214. The Defense Industry , Jacques S. Gansler, The MIT Press, 1980
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215. 14th Annual DOD Cost Analysis Symposium, 26-29 August 1979
216
.
A Bibliography of Selected RAND Publications (R&D and Systems
Acquisition) , SB- 1029, RAND Corporation, November 1980
217. Acquisition Process , L. S. Kollmorgen, Director, Systems Analysis
Division, OPNAV; Memorandum for the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (RE&S), 24 December 1980
218. Major System Cost Increases , W. B. LaBerge, Principal Deputy
Undersecretary of defense, Research and Engineering; Memorandum for
Dr. Pierre, ASA (RDA), Dr. Mann, ASN (RES), and Dr. Hermann, ASAF (RDL),
Late 1980
219. Washington Roundup - Cost Analysis; Congress Unit Hits Defense
Estimates , Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 February 1981
220. CNM Semi -Annual Corporate Review , November /December 1980
221. Review of Navy R&D Management 1946-1973, 3ooz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc.
June 1976
222. Results of the Ninth Annual DOD/FAI Acquisition Research Symposium ;
Federal Acquisition Institute, October 1980
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I223. GAP Says New Weapons Are Often Too Complex , J. Fialke, Washington Star
224. Defense Facts of Life , F. Spinney, December 1980
225. The Military-Industrial Complex , Rep. Bob Wilson, Program Manager
Newsletter, DSMC 35, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1 Mar-Apr 1980
225. Foolish Adversaries , 0. C. 8oileau, Program Manager Newsletter,
DSMC 34, Vol. IX, No. 1, Jan-Feb 1980
227. Improving the Acquisition System , R. Massey, G. Smith, and J. Witten
Concepts, Journal of Defense System Acquisition Management, Winter 1981,
Vol. 4, No. 1
228. Government and Industry Relationships: An Acquisition Manager's
Viewpoint , VADM Levering Smith, USN (Ret.), DSMC Program Manager's
Newsletter, July-August, 1978, Vol. VII, no. 5.
229. Defense Industrial Responsiveness and the "New Economics" ,
Presentation to the Defense Science Board Summer Study, D.H. White, Vice
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